Economic Dreams - Economic Nightmares

Blame it on Greenspan and Bush

The blame game will go on and on, particularly as the mess world financial crisis deepens. But this, almost a month old from the Financial Times needs to be part of the record. Particularly since the Republican contenders for US President keep blaming it on the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:

Oxley hits back at ideologues, Greg Farrell, Financial Times, Sept. 9: … Ohio Republican [Mike Oxley] who headed the House financial services committee until his retirement after mid-term elections last year, blames the mess on ideologues within the White House as well as Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve.

The critics have forgotten that the House passed a GSE reform bill in 2005 that could well have prevented the current crisis, says Mr Oxley, now vice-chairman of Nasdaq.

He fumes about the criticism of his House colleagues. “All the handwringing and bedwetting is going on without remembering how the House stepped up on this,” he says. “What did we get from the White House? We got a one-finger salute.”

The House bill, the 2005 Federal Housing Finance Reform Act, would have created a stronger regulator with new powers to increase capital at Fannie and Freddie, to limit their portfolios and to deal with the possibility of receivership.

Mr Oxley reached out to Barney Frank, then the ranking Democrat on the committee and now its chairman, to secure support on the other side of the aisle. But after winning bipartisan support in the House, where the bill passed by 331 to 90 votes, the legislation lacked a champion in the Senate and faced hostility from the Bush administration.

Adamant that the only solution to the problems posed by Fannie and Freddie was their privatisation, the White House attacked the bill. Mr Greenspan also weighed in, saying that the House legislation was worse than no bill at all. …

HT: Paul Krugman

Soros: Financial Crisis Stems from Super Bubble

Like me, George Soros is no believer in "equilibrium economics". Rather he believes that sometimes we will see an equilibrium, but that it will be short-lived. Like Hyman Minsky, Soros argues that stability will itself sow the seeds of the next instability. Soros says we are in a unique place with our current crisis, experiencing both inflation and a recession at the same time. Hear/read more from Soros on today's NPR Morning Edition, Financial Crisis Stems from Super Bubble:

… Soros blames what he calls a "super-bubble" that started about 25 years ago. That's when a less-is-more philosophy became popular with economic regulators. That allowed Wall Street to invest increasing amounts of money in credit.

"The idea was that regulators always make mistakes, state interference in the markets just messes things up," Soros says. "And that was a false idea .... Regulators are human and bound to make mistakes, but markets are also human and they are also bound to make mistakes. Instead of markets always being right, they're actually always groping at trying to find out what the facts are. But they never get it right." …

Soros says there's a "super-bubble" in the economy that's bigger than just the recent housing crises, and he blames exotic financial instruments for helping cause it.

"The markets have introduced financial instruments with fancy names — CDOs and CLOs and all these strange instruments that are traded in very large volumes. And they were all constructed on the belief deviations are random.

Soros also has a new book out. Here is a snip from the introducion:

A New Paradigm for Financial Markets, Introduction, George Soros: We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. In some ways it resembles other crises that have occurred in the last twenty-five years, but there is a profound difference: the current crisis marks the end of an era of credit expansion based on the dollar as the international reserve currency. The periodic crises were part of a larger boom-bust process; the current crisis is the culmination of a super-boom that has lasted for more than twenty-five years.

To understand what is going on we need a new paradigm. The currently prevailing paradigm, namely that financial markets tend towards equilibrium, is both false and misleading; our current troubles can be largely attributed to the fact that the international financial system has been developed on the basis of that paradigm.

The new paradigm I am proposing is not confined to the financial markets. It deals with the relationship between thinking and reality, and it claims that misconceptions and misinterpretations play a major role in shaping the course of history. …

Let me explain briefly how the theory of reflexivity applies to the [current] crisis. Contrary to classical economic theory, which assumes perfect knowledge, neither market participants nor the monetary and fiscal authorities can base their decisions purely on knowledge. Their misjudgments and misconceptions affect market prices, and, more importantly, market prices affect the so-called fundamentals that they are supposed to reflect. Market prices do not deviate from a theoretical equilibrium in a random manner, as the current paradigm holds. Participants' and regulators' views never correspond to the actual state of affairs; that is to say, markets never reach the equilibrium postulated by economic theory. There is a two-way reflexive connection between perception and reality which can give rise to initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating boom-bust processes, or bubbles. Every bubble consists of a trend and a misconception that interact in a reflexive manner. There has been a bubble in the U.S. housing market, but the current crisis is not merely the bursting of the housing bubble. It is bigger than the periodic financial crises we have experienced in our lifetime. All those crises are part of what I call a super-bubble—a long-term reflexive process which has evolved over the last twenty-five years or so. It consists of a prevailing trend, credit expansion, and a prevailing misconception, market fundamentalism (aka laissez-faire in the nineteenth century), which holds that markets should be given free rein. The previous crises served as successful tests which reinforced the prevailing trend and the prevailing misconception. The current crisis constitutes the turning point when both the trend and the misconception have become unsustainable. …

NPR Does Subprime

If you want a very good lay person's edition of the Credit Bubble mess, listen to NPR's Global Pool of Money Got Too Hungry (audio, 13 min., All Things Considered, May 9): "Adam Davidson and This American Life's Alex Blumberg jointly report on how rising defaults on subprime mortgages in the U.S. have became a global financial crisis. This American Life host Ira Glass talks with Michele Noris".

NPR demystifies SEVs, CDOs, MBSs, "Liar Loans," and more. The narrative concludes: "… Nobody really questioned things. And why should they? Everybody was making money — right up to the day the bottom fell out."

An hour-long version — The Giant Pool of Money — airs this weekend on This American Life.

Grizzly Times, Yet Some Hope on Horizon

Grizzly Bears roam the financial landscape: Doug Noland and Michael Shedlock here (or here) are ever-bearish, but so is Barry Ritholtz (Forbes video link). The "D" word is uttered ever-more-frequently. Yet I find myself thinking that just beyond this likely deep recession we are at the leading edge of a reformation: re-forming financial institutions—private and government—and bringing US and other banking "kicking and screaming" into the 21st Century.

In this I share hopes with Brad DeLong, Paul McCulley, Robert Shiller, and George Soros (or better still watch Soros: via the Financial Times in extended post). No one who is awake believes we will escape our current moment without at minimum a deep, prolonged recession. But some observers, like those just mentioned are less cynical than are they who believe that we are predestined to once-again repeat the tragedies of the recent past and earlier times—in particular to continue to reward speculative excess.

As per reform, Thursday's Senate Oversight hearings on the Bear Stearns mess (C-Span video link)) is almost 5 hrs. long, but worth watching to better understand where Ben Bernanke (Fed), Timothy Geithner ( NY Fed), Christopher Cox (SEC), and Robert Steel (Treasury) stand regarding hoped-for reregulation. (I recommend first panel: 3 hr. 40 min.)

It is by no means certain that we will indeed reregulate our system to once-again disallow the worst excesses of extended bouts of irrational exuberance and the irrational pessimism that must follow. But we might. We must! I've hoped for reforms too often in the past and been disappointed, but signs of hope are on the horizon at a time when moderates are beginning to take the reins of power in the US Congress away from borrow-and-spend neoCons on the far right and traditional tax-and-spend Democrats on the far left.

Let's not be eager to blame the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the SEC for this mess. NeoCons and "free market fundamentalism" are better targets for blame. And let's not forget that there was good reason for bringing the Federal Reserve system into being long ago—to curb the excesses of "boom and bust" cycles. The system worked reasonably well after the late 20s, early 30s debacle to disallow Hyman Minsky’s PONZI FINANCE moments. That is, it worked well until the so-called "Republican Revolution" dismantled regulatory functions of government here in the US.

I'm not naïve enough to believe that we could have weathered the storms brought about by recent financial and technological innovations without some pain, but the real tragedy I see is that "we the people" of the USA haven't yet figured out that we need good government to accompany good markets—and that neither can work effectively in isolation or without continued vigilance and oversight from citizens and the press (now fortified with internet commentary).

Government agencies and institutions must begin to wake up to realities that W. Edwards Deming, Peter Drucker, and many newer management writers have helped the best of our private-sector entities understand—that innovation and quality reform must be institutionalized into the fabric of agencies and institutions, to be ongoing and ever-vigilant of changes in external environment that must be incorporated into internal corporate and government cultures. Let's hope wider government reform begins with the Fed, the SEC, and the Treasury.

Doug Noland: 'Breakdown of Wall Street Alchemy'

In his latest Credit Bubble Bulletin, Doug Noland concludes that "GSEs are poised as the next shoes to drop — the next Dominoes in an Escalating Contagion. … Simplifying highly complex circumstances, the various risk models that empowered the greatest leveraging of risk in the history of finance no longer function as expected — or as required to maintain highly leveraged exposures to a multitude of escalating risks. And it was all just only a matter of time. The overriding flaw was to ignore that a runaway Bubble in market-based finance ensured that various market and Credit risks all coalesced into One Massive, Unmanageable, Highly Correlated, Unhedgable, Undiversifiable Association of Interrelated Systemic Risks. "

Although Noland's assessments continue to be bleak, I find them to be more 'on the mark' week-on-week than any other source I go to. Maybe I'm just hearing what I confirms my preconceived biases. Or maybe not? More from Noland (emphasis added):

The Breakdown of Wall Street Alchemy, Doug Noland, Feb 15: This week provided further confirmation of ongoing momentous Credit market developments. … Like the asset-backed commercial paper market that was popular with structured investment vehicles until last summer, auction-rate securities, a form of rolling short-term funding for long-term municipal commitments, have become fashionable in recent years."

"Auction-rate securities" has joined the beleaguered ranks of "subprime," "asset-backed commercial paper," "SIVs," and the "monolines" — financial structures that flourished during the prolonged Credit Bubble but no longer pass market muster in today's Post-Bubble Risk Revulsion Backdrop. This week's "unwinding" of the "auction-rate" market and the blowing out of Credit spreads should be seen as an escalation of the ongoing unwind of "Contemporary finance" and its many avenues of Risk Intermediation.

On numerous fronts, the markets and economy confront a Highly Problematic Breakdown in "Wall Street Alchemy" — the disintegration of key processes that had for some time transformed ever-increasing quantities of risky loans into perceived safe and liquid debt instruments that enjoyed insatiable demand in the marketplace. In the case of the “auction-rate securities,” it was a clever restyling of long-term and generally illiquid municipal debt (as well as student loans and other borrowings) into perceived liquid securities that could be easily sold at regularly recurring auctions (every one to a few weeks). With scores of flush corporate treasury departments and wealthy clients (managing huge Credit Bubble-induced cash-flows) keen to earn extra (after-tax) yield on "cash equivalents," the Wall Street firms had been diligent in ensuring (making markets for clients, when necessary) a highly liquid and enticing marketplace. Now, with the onset of Risk Revulsion and Acute Financial Sector Balance Sheet Pressures, investors are running for cover and Wall Street firms are shunning the use of their own capital to support this and other markets. Market liquidity has evaporated, confidence has been shattered, and we are witnessing yet another "run" on a previously popular risk market/asset class. The music has stopped for another game of musical chairs.

This week saw heightened systemic stress stampede toward the epicenter of the U.S. Credit system. It certainly didn't help that insurance behemoth AIG Group reported an almost $5bn writedown of its Credit default swap portfolio or that international securities dealer behemoth UBS reported massive losses on its U.S. Credit positions. Confidence was further shaken by huge losses reported by mortgage insurers, as well the twists and turns of the "monoline" bust turned apparent bailout. In the markets, various indices of investment grade Credits widened sharply to record levels. The key "dollar swap" (interest-rate derivative hedging) market saw spreads widen sharply. Agency spreads also widened significantly. Benchmark Fannie Mae MBS spreads widened a remarkable 20 bps against 10-year Treasuries, while agency debt spreads widened a noteworthy 12.5 basis points to 69.5 bps (high since November). The Breakdown of Wall Street Alchemy is now pushing the Credit Market Dislocation uncomfortably close to the core of our monetary system.

I'll return to financial aspects of this crisis, but I definitely feel the economic ramifications of the unfolding Credit Crisis are receiving short shrift in the media. This week saw parts of the municipal debt market grind to a virtual halt and the corporate debt market take another significant blow. Investment grade debt issuance has now slowed markedly after beginning the year at near record pace. At this point, the junk, CDO, ABS, "private-label" MBS, muni, and even investment grade debt markets are all somewhere between impaired, dislocated and completely dysfunctional. There is no mystery behind the recent string of abysmal economic reports.

The preliminary reading on February University of Michigan Consumer Confidence dropped 8.8 points to the lowest level since the 1992 recession. The Economic Conditions index sank and the Economic Outlook index plunged, while one-year Inflation Expectations rose from 3.4% to 3.7%. The Economic Outlook has sunk a remarkable 22 points since July. Falling national home prices are clearly wearing on confidence. This week, Dataquick reported that home sales throughout much of California have collapsed to more than 20-year lows, while home price declines accelerate. This is a huge unfolding issue/debacle for the MBS, agency, mortgage insurance, CDO, and Credit derivatives markets, not to mention the U.S. banking system and real economy. Countrywide Financial reported delinquencies on its $1.5 TN mortgage servicing portfolio had jumped to 7.47%, up from the year ago 4.32%. The New York "Empire" Manufacturing index sank to the lowest levels since April 2003.

The economy is now faltering badly and there is every reason to expect the downturn to gather pace — negative real interest rates compliments of the Fed and stimulus package compliments of the federal government notwithstanding. While fourth quarter data is not yet available, one can look to the first nine months of 2007 to gain important perspective. Despite the dislocation in the subprime mortgage market, Non-Financial Debt Growth accelerated from Q2's 7.2% to Q3's 8.9% (from the Fed’s Z.1 report). And while Household Debt Growth had slowed to a 6.9% pace, Business Borrowings accelerated to a blistering 11.9% annualized rate in the third quarter. This was the strongest corporate debt growth since the tech/telecom boom in the late nineties. Importantly, total (financial and non-financial) Corporate Debt expanded at an 11.1% rate during the first three quarters of 2007, followed by 9.3% growth in State & Local government borrowings. And while residential mortgage debt was slowing meaningfully, Commercial Mortgage Debt was expanding at an almost 13% rate.

Total (financial and non-financial) Credit expanded a seasonally-adjusted and annualized record $5.0 TN during the third quarter — as nominal GDP expanded at a 6% pace. While many trumpeted the "resiliency" of the U.S. economy in the face of mortgage and housing woes — more adept analysis would have focused on the massive Credit creation that had come to be required to sustain the Bubble Economy. Importantly, the faltering subprime market initially instigated only greater excesses throughout commercial real estate, municipal finance, M&A finance, and corporate lending more generally. The Credit Bubble was sustained at the great cost of heightened instability and weakened structures — especially throughout leveraged lending, state & local finance, and investment-grade corporate borrowings. Keep in mind that through the third quarter CDO issuance was actually running ahead of 2006's record pace. Until the fourth quarter, record Credit growth continued to fuel the finance-driven economy. This is all now coming home to roost.

Today, with bursting bubbles in corporate and municipal finance joining the mortgage bust, the U.S. Bubble economy has quickly fallen desperately short of sufficient Credit and liquidity. And the greater the Credit market dislocation and broad-based tightness of Credit, the bleaker become economic prospects and the more intense the Revulsion to Wall Street's Credit instruments. The days of free-flowing cheap finance for home buyers, state and local governments, LBO firms, commercial real estate speculators, college students, risky auto buyers, and high-risk Credit card holders are over — and they will not be returning for some time to come.

When I have previously underestimated the "resiliency" of the U.S. Credit Bubble and economy, it was in each instance a failure to appreciate the capability of Wall Street finance to expand to ever greater degrees of Bubble excess. Today, with "contemporary finance" mired in a historic collapse, I am confident that the Credit system is today only in a position to surprise on the downside. It is this framework that shapes my view of a rapidly escalating Credit crisis feeding an arduous economic adjustment period.

And while it could undoubtedly prod a highly speculative stock market, there is no resolution to the "monoline" dilemma that would meaningfully influence the trajectory of the unfolding Credit and economic bust. As we've been saying for awhile now, confidence in Wall Street finance has been irreparably shattered. Trust has been broken in "AAA" ratings, "mark-to-model," CDO structures, myriad risk models, Credit insurance, counter-party risk, and various instruments and vehicles for intermediating risk in the markets. Moreover, old fashioned lending will not come close to sufficing the demands of a highly imbalanced Bubble economy, especially with bankers nervous and retrenching. Again, we're witnessing nothing less than the Breakdown of Wall Street Alchemy — one that took a turn for the worst this week.

In a disconcerting development, recent market developments seem to confirm that the leveraged speculating community and the GSEs are poised as the next shoes to drop — the next Dominoes in an Escalating Contagion. Along with the "monolines" and mortgage insurers, the "Credit default swap market" and GSE mortgage Risk Intermediation were at the epicenter of the most egregious Systemic Risk Distortions and Accumulations. They are now quickly moving to the forefront of Current Acute Fragilities. Simplifying highly complex circumstances, the various risk models that empowered the greatest leveraging of risk in the history of finance no longer function as expected — or as required to maintain highly leveraged exposures to a multitude of escalating risks. And it was all just only a matter of time. The overriding flaw was to ignore that a runaway Bubble in market-based finance ensured that various market and Credit risks all coalesced into One Massive, Unmanageable, Highly Correlated, Unhedgable, Undiversifiable Association of Interrelated Systemic Risks.

Bill Gross: Mr. Bernanke - we have a problem

Bill Gross's Feb 1 Investment Outlook is worth a look. Echoing Paul Krugman, Gross suggests that we now need some deep Keynesian stimulus, not the 'Stimulus Lite' fare being bandied about by the Bush Administration and the Congress. Implicitly, but without any real plan to make it happen, Gross also suggests we need to return to earlier fundamentals of honesty and thrift, abandoning the 'quick fix' mentality that has at once encouraged speculation and outright financial fraud and buried the American middle classes under mountains of debt. Soundbite: "[T]he U.S. economy and its somewhat coupled global companion will sleep walk for some time and a resumption of prosperity as we knew it will be dependent on reforms of monetary and fiscal policy resembling the 1930s more than our past decade." Here's more:

Bill Gross, Better Late than Never, Feb 1: … Paul Krugman, …, proposing revolutionary solutions for the Japanese recessionary malaise of the 1990s and writing a book in 1998 entitled The Return of Depression Economics … referred to the fact that the crucial task of future policy would be to bolster demand as was the case in the FDR-driven 1930s as opposed to encourage supply which has been the case since the Reagan revolution. Although Krugman doesn't comment, in my opinion, it's not that Reagan was wrong — he was in fact brilliantly correct and timely in his supply-side revolution.

Iverson aside: I can't go along with Gross here. I find the very idea that Reagan "was brilliantly correct" repulsive. I believe that Reagan helped to mislead the US, and helped jump-start a 30+ year-long "irrational exuberance" party that is now unwinding badly. Back to Gross:

That pendulum, however, appears to have swung too far in the direction of the private market. But Krugman (and yours truly) was a tad early in his forecast for reversal I think, because of the failure to recognize the potency and the inventiveness of modern finance.

Until recently, U.S. and therefore global demand has been driven by the ability to lower interest rates and extend credit to an increasing majority of Americans. Mortgages, auto finance, and credit cards were offered on increasingly liberal terms and continually lower yield and risk spreads because of Wall Street ingenuity and — importantly — the naïve endorsement of their black magic by rating services willing to sell AAAs for a fee. … Demand, as Krugman would likely retrospectively recognize, was bolstered and supported by innovative, securitized finance which in turn was nurtured by lax regulation and a belief that things could not go wrong — and if they did — that policy makers, both monetarily and fiscally oriented, would make things right. The repair, if needed, was labeled the "Keynesian compact" and it made for a deal with the American public: it would be OK to have free markets because policymakers know enough to prevent another Great Depression. Demand could always be stimulated with a combination of easy money/budget deficits. Prosperity in effect, was guaranteed.

Well "probably" guaranteed — but the historic growth rate of that prosperity may now be threatened. Because demand in the form of consumption has been artificially and fictitiously stimulated in recent years by financial engineering run amuck, there is a legitimate question as to whether its black hole imploding destructiveness can be totally countered with another dose of lower yields and deficit spending packages. The $150 billion "return to sender" deficit plan advanced by Bush and the Congress, for instance, amounts to just 1% of GDP and is labeled temporary. It will be of marginal benefit to long-term prosperity. To understand why, consider that the productivity of our economy ultimately depends on its ability to 1) innovate, and 2) save and invest, and that there is little of either in this stimulus package. Some have even suggested — and with my somewhat grudging concession — that this package will help the Chinese economy more than ours. Americans will use the rebates to buy Chinese imports offered at Wal-Mart and the $150 billion will then wind its way inevitably back to Asian coffers. The U.S. needs a Krugman "demand-based" fiscal package alright, but a $300-$500 billion permanent one, in addition to the proposed temporary package, because as mentioned in last month's Outlook [Pyramids Crumbling], as the system of modern day levered shadow finance slows to a crawl or even contracts at the edges, its ability to systemically fertilize economic growth must be called into question. But government writing checks for American consumers which then flow to foreign central banks is not the permanent solution; it only makes sense in the short-term as a life preserver. To provide a stable recovery path, government spending needs to fill the gap — not consumption. Public works programs, badly needed infrastructure repairs, as well as spending on research and development projects should form the heart of our path to recovery. Assistance for homeowners? That too — figure out a fiscal/regulatory way to stop the slide in housing prices and foreclosures but please — no traffic jams at the Wal-Mart checkout counter in 2009 and beyond.

Approaches to monetary policy must change as well. 1% short rates were so effective 5 years ago that they not only bolstered demand but created a housing bubble of Frankensteinian proportions. Those days, however were influenced by the creation and implementation of adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) that were priced at the short end of the yield curve. Millions of ARMs were issued at 2% and 3% teaser rates, many with terms of up to 5 years before their inexorable adjustment upwards. Surfeits of houses were bought at artificial prices because of these generous terms and billions in home equity loans were taken out — both driving demand and the economy forward. But adjustable-rate mortgages are a dying relic. Originators will no longer offer them except on onerous terms. No more teasers or pleasers of that ilk; there are regulators to deal with, and lawyers on the prowl with class action lawsuits in their briefcases.

And so the monetary attempt to halt housing's — and therefore the economy's — downward slide rests on the shoulders of the 30-year mortgage. If so, then Mr. Bernanke — we have a problem. First of all these 6-7% 30-year mortgages now require a significantly higher down payment than in prior years. 20% down? Say what? Where does a 30-year-old couple get that kind of money? Secondly, however, and just as important, what motivates a future homeowner to pay 6%+ interest for an asset that is going down in price? It was an easy decision to pay subprime yields of that and then some when housing prices were accelerating at double-digit annual percentages; the benefit was obvious. Now however, with prices in negative territory, the risk/reward is tilted towards the renter.

My point is that Chairman Bernanke must recognize the reduced benefits and obvious dangers of a déjà vu trek to 1% short rates. Those yields produced 5% 30-year mortgage rates to the homeowner for a 2-3 month period in 2003 and they could do so again, but bubble creating, inflation inducing damage to the U.S. dollar would be the likely result now. Best to stop far short of 1% and at the same time encourage reforms in FHA government assisted programs that would permit subsidized mortgage rates with minimal down payments.

An artificially low, 1% short-term interest rate was an elixir during the days of a burgeoning shadow banking system. It cannot be the solution now.

In combination, a well constructed, more than temporary fiscal/monetary stimulus plan is what is required to rejuvenate a U.S. economy reeling from a low punch delivered by a private market economy gone too far. Its "Rosemary's Baby" took the form of a shadow banking system based on leverage and the fateful conclusion that a finance-based economy alone can deliver prosperity. It cannot. As Keynes theorized and then Krugman affirmed, when private demand falters, it becomes the responsibility of government to fill the breach. Because it likely will not do so effectively until after a new Administration is elected in late 2008, the U.S. economy and its somewhat coupled global companion will sleep walk for some time and a resumption of prosperity as we knew it will be dependent on reforms of monetary and fiscal policy resembling the 1930s more than our past decade. Better late than never.

Deconstructing 'Recession 2008?'

I spent an hour yesterday listening to three economists (Brad DeLong, Mike Mandel, and William Beach) discuss our current plight. I found their insights compelling. Areas of agreement, included:

• Don't look to the US Government for effective Fiscal Policy Help — particularly in an election year
• Don't look to the Fed to ease much pain since they are pretty much helpless in the face of a faltering US housing market (See Krugman too)
• Best we can do is to see both borrowers and lenders share the pain, with some pain (how much?) shared by the rest of us

The forum was hosted by Dave Iverson (a different, more erudite Dave Iverson) and aired on KQED, NPR, San Francisco. It's well worth an hour of your time, if only to get better acquainted with Brad DeLong's longer-than-a-post reflections (but skip the questions and answers). From Delong's Grasping Reality…

KQED | Forum: Recession 2008? [Jan. 11]

http://www.kqed.org/.stream/anon/radio/forum/2008/01/2008-01-11a-forum.mp3

Host: Dave Iverson

Guests:

• Brad DeLong, professor of economics at UC Berkeley
• Mike Mandel, chief economist for BusinessWeek
• William Beach, senior economist and director at the Center for Data Analysis at the Heritage Foundation

Thanksgiving Cheer: HERE'S ROUBINI!

With the stock markets increasingly jittery, and just in time for Thanksgiving, I can't resist leaving a little ray of sunshine BAG OF GLOOM at your doorstep: via FT Alphaville, Stand by for "generalized systemic financial meltdown", Helen Thomas, Nov 21 or straight to the source, HERE'S ROUBINI …

Nouriel Roubini, Nov 16: … I now see the risk of a severe and worsening liquidity and credit crunch leading to a generalized meltdown of the financial system of a severity and magnitude like we have never observed before. In this extreme scenario whose likelihood is increasing we could see a generalized run on some banks; and runs on a couple of weaker (non-bank) broker dealers that may go bankrupt with severe and systemic ripple effects on a mass of highly leveraged derivative instruments that will lead to a seizure of the derivatives markets (think of LTCM to the power of three); a collapse of the ABCP market and a disorderly collapse of the SIVs and conduits; massive losses on money market funds with a run on both those sponsored by banks and those not sponsored by banks (with the latter at even more severe risk as the recent effective bailout of the formers’ losses by theirs sponsoring banks is not available to those not being backed by banks); ever growing defaults and losses ($500 billion plus) in subprime, near prime and prime mortgages with severe known-on effect on the RMBS and CDOs market; massive losses in consumer credit (auto loans, credit cards); severe problems and losses in commercial real estate and related CMBS; the drying up of liquidity and credit in a variety of asset backed securities putting the entire model of securitization at risk; runs on hedge funds and other financial institutions that do not have access to the Fed's lender of last resort support; a sharp increase in corporate defaults and credit spreads; and a massive process of re-intermediation into the banking system of activities that were until now altogether securitized. …

As differentiated a wee bit by Yves Smith:

Naked Capitalism, Nov 17: … I agree with Roubini that there is the very real possibility of a financial horrorshow, However, I differ with him on some of the particulars. We are not going to see bank runs. We didn't have them in the late 1980s where S&Ls were actually failing and Citi nearly went under. However, we are already seeing institutional money getting very costly for Citi, and their tsuris have only begun. And we are seeing more examples of Citi-type behavior, where banks have what effectively were contingent liabilities (think, for example, of the guarantees and/or cash injections to keep affiliated money market funds from breaking the buck). These funding or liability demands are coming at precisely the time when bank equity is under strain, due to the need to increase loss reserves and writedowns. Look, for example, at asset backed commercial paper. The Financial Times reported today that banks have shown substantial balance sheet growth of late. But it isn't net new lending; it's credit commitments or actual drawdown related to ABCP.

I expect Citi to be in serious trouble in 6 to 12 months, and that specter will increase risk premia for many banks, and could push others towards the edge. So I anticipate a lot of near-failures, some gunshot marriages, and possibly even real bank collapses, but the mechanism will not be a run by retail depositors.

But I expect to see more serious damage among the "large complex financial institutions" of which Citi is one. There are 16 behemoths that have been deemed by the Bank of England as especially important to global credit intermediation. One is already in the process of taking a body blow. If we see damage to any others, it will lead to a contraction in the credit markets, both directly (shrinkage of their balance sheets) and indirectly (shrinkage of everyone else's balance sheets due to new found conservatism and sharply higher borrowing costs). The securitization market, absent government agency paper, is not functioning very well right now. It will really start laboring if conditions on Wall Street continue to deteriorate.

And if securitization looks less attractive because investors are far more stringent (and maybe no longer believe ratings) and Wall Street looks to have lost a couple of cylinders, then the banks need to step into the breech. Ah, but will they? Banks for the most part are no longer in the habit of keeping a lot of their own loans on their balance sheet. …

Robert Kuttner's Parallels to 1920s, and some differences

Below find some of Robert Kuttner's very good, very harsh Oct 2 testimony to the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. In addition to rehashing historical parallels between the era and the 20s euphoria and bubble bust, he talks to more-recent-era deregulation and letting the "free market" good times roll, and, of course, the bubbles that came as a byproduct. Here's a news story from Quote.com covering the hearing. And here are the other testimonies and a webcast of the hearing.

Kuttner's four parallels between this era and the one that led to the 1929 crash are:

• Creation of asset bubbles
• Securitization of credit
• Excessive use of leverage
• Failure of regulation to keep up with financial innovation
• The nearly universal conviction, 80 years ago and today, that markets are so perfectly self-regulating that government's main job is to protect property rights, and otherwise just get out of the way

Kuttner's arguments are not unlike those made by some others over the last few years, that we've tried to chronicle here. It is nice to know, or to at least believe, that more people are listening now. To Kuttner:

Greenspan Still Doesn't Get It: Who does?

I was going to just lay out the guts of Doug Noland's latest, continued rant about the impending blow off of our giant "Credit Bubble". But then I wandered over to Jim Kunstler's place and found that his continued rant about our "Long Emergency" deals with Greenspan's reemergence as well. Kunstler's version is more fun, darkly, so we'll air it first (be sure to go to the source, 'cause I left out some of the funniest parts):

Shocked! Shocked! Jim Kunstler, Sept 17: Alan Greenspan's memoirs are being flogged across the airwaves, bandwidths and printing presses, and the cohort of those who comment on public affairs in these media are shocked by the Maestro's confessions -- first, that a housing bubble emerged out of his leadership in the banking sector, and second that the Iraq war is about oil. As usual, they're getting it all wrong -- about as wrong as Al himself got it. But that is the way of things in this age of cultural dissipation and gross cognitive dissonance.

Greenspan claims he had no idea that his cutting of interest rates to near zero would produce any irregularities in the US economy. Apparently he hadn't noticed that the Big Fund Boyz called him "Easy Al" for a reason. Or that when you introduce nearly free "money" (as in "available for lending") into a system of financial trade, the recognition of moral hazard tends to evaporate. As the nation's chief bank regulator, Greenspan also apparently failed to notice the upsurge in dodgy lending practices previously only seen among mafia loan sharks, drug dealers, or twelve-year-olds playing Monopoly.

But the really funny part of all this is that the media columnists are acting as though the American public got hoodwinked by Al. Which raises the question: just what the fuck was the public thinking when they bought half-million dollar houses on salaries under 60-K, taking out no-money-down, interest-optional balloon mortgages and other tricked-up contracts? The answer is: they walked into these arrangements with their eyes open because they thought they could get something for nothing. They thought the trend of steeply rising house prices would continue indefinitely and enable them to wiggle free of any hazard by flipping their houses to an endless supply of greater fools who would be there waiting to turn the very same trick. And the smoothies downstream in the mortgage and banking rackets were no less guided by avarice when they cooked up their formulas for bundling half-baked mortgages into tranches of tradeable securities. Easy Al may have failed to notice what was going on here, but then so did everybody else from The Wall Street Journal to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

This, of course, represents an insidious psychology. It could only happen in a culture that has come off the rails mentally, so to speak, as ours has in the sense that nobody has any sense of consequence, neither the leaders nor those who affect to follow the leaders. The leading religion in America is not evangelical Christianity, it is the worship of unearned riches, and its golden rule is the belief that is is possible to get something for nothing. Its holy shrines are Las Vegas and Wall Street. …

No, the American public, including the cheerleaders in the media, have only themselves to blame for the bitter harvest now underway in the asset and credit markets. And thus it would be salutary thing for Baby Jeezus, or the forces of nature, or whatever powers guide the universe, to now kick the shit out of them, so to speak, financially, because that is exactly what the American public is full of, from top to bottom….

Now, as to the shock of Al's revelation that the Iraq war is about oil -- the media and the public has got this all wrong, too. The logic here seems to be that because the Iraq war is about oil it is therefore unnecessary, optional, a mistake, an indulgence, something we should not dirty our hands in. In fact, the Iraq war is not about oil, per se, so much as it is about America's behavior here at home, about the choices we make for how we live on this continent. None of those who complain most loudly about our military presence in Iraq have advanced any proposals for reforming how we live here -- and hence for our enslavement to oil, much of the world's remaining supply of which happens to be in the neighborhood of Iraq. When these complainers start complaining about the ubiquitous acceptance of suburban sprawl and abject car-dependency -- and this includes the environmental boy scouts out there who want to get merit badges for buying hybrid cars -- then they will deserve to be taken seriously. Until then, the American people have got exactly the grinding war that they deserve. Let them whine about it all the way to the Nascar tracks, and let them console themselves with giant plastic bottles of Pepsi Cola and buckets of chicken raised on corn grown with oil byproducts.

On CBS's "60-Minutes" show last night, Greenspan, in his new role as a private sector economic consultant made predictions for the coming months in the US economy. He declared that the financial sector would get over the current credit squeeze as if it were a mild case of indigestion…. This gets back to the previous point about the Iraq war and oil in particular. Al doesn't get it. CBS's sycophant reporters don't get it. Nobody gets it. We are entering the zone of the long emergency in which the primary resource needed to run the industrial economies will become scarce, expensive, and profoundly destabilizing to markets and to normal life, such as it is known in this country. And the current problem in the markets is a reflection of the resource bankruptcy we are facing. Our problems are not about credit, they are about permanent insolvency. …

"Didn't Really Get It", Doug Noland, Sept. 14: I found it ironic that during the same week Alan Greenspan admitted he "Didn't Really Get It" when it came to the risks associated with subprime lending, Chairman Bernanke publicly reiterated and expanded his "global savings glut" thesis. …

Mr. Greenspan now admits that he didn’t really "Get It" until late 2005, while Dr. Bernanke's intellectual focus at the time was explaining how mounting U.S. Current Account Deficits were a phenomenon of global savings and investment dynamics. Both were more than intellectually content to sit back and marvel at U.S. economic "productivity" and the capacity of contemporary finance to Inflate Credit. Both also worked diligently to construct a framework rationalizing why the Fed needn't pierce Bubbles nor even go so far as administering a little "tough love". Both are curiously oblivious — at least publicly — to the notion of Pernicious Credit and Speculative Excess.

There is no reasonable excuse for our central bankers' failure to recognize and then move to check intensifying Mortgage Credit Bubble dynamics by 2004 — at the latest. It was (and remains) similarly inexcusable to disregard the U.S. Credit system's prominent role in financing rapidly escalating Current Account Deficits and resultant worsening global imbalances. …

The "global liquidity glut" has fomented myriad Bubbles — and the reality that seemingly all of the global ones remain very much in force empowers Chairman Bernanke to stick steadfastly to his "savings glut" theorizing. Yet "saving" doesn't fuel Bubbles — excessive borrowings do. …

Conventional thinking has it that the world economic backdrop, outside of U.S. subprime and housing woes, is vibrant and sound. This favorable backdrop, it is believed, explains global equities markets resiliency in the face of mounting U.S. and global Credit woes. [Alternatively,] the Global Credit Bubble and "Liquidity Glut" perspective takes a quite negative view of the current global backdrop. Bubbles proliferate.

Admittedly, most global Bubbles have been impervious to the Bursting U.S. Credit Bubble. China is a case in point. Yet there are important unappreciated dynamics to contemplate. First, domestic Credit Bubble Dynamics have become well entrenched around the world, especially with U.S. dollar impairment working to decisively limit the risk of currency runs in, say, China, Russia, Brazil, India, Asia and "developing" economies in general. The weak dollar and unrelenting U.S. liquidity outflows (C.A. Deficits and speculative flows) have nurtured quite atypical stability for a group of currencies that would otherwise suffer the acute vulnerability incident to overheated domestic Credit systems, asset markets, and economies.

[T]oday's backdrop would be altogether different had it not been for aggressive and concerted central bank intervention. Huge liquidity injections — and, as important, assurances from Chairman Bernanke to use "all of the tools at his disposal" — kept the U.S. and much of the global securities markets from seizing up. As it was, the extent of Acute Financial Fragility was perceived to require an immediate and bold marketplace onslaught that, ironically, worked to underpin most global Bubbles. Certainly, not much froth was allowed to come out of global equities. No froth has been removed from global inflationary pressures. Lower global yields are destabilizing and portend only greater Global Monetary Disorder.

It is the view of the Bernanke Fed (as it would have been of Greenspan) that a U.S. recession can and should be avoided. This is flawed and dangerous ideology. It is the market's view that the Fed will lower interest rates to whatever level necessary to sustain the U.S. expansion. This is wishful thinking. Recent history has spoiled both the Fed and the markets. Today, recession cannot be avoided, and the weak dollar and robust global inflationary backdrop will limit the Fed's flexibility.

As for our economy, there will be no escaping the harsh consequences associated with the bursting of a historic Mortgage Finance Bubble. Our Bubble Economy has been left severely imbalanced and acutely vulnerable, and it is simply impossible to avoid major disruptions associated with an abrupt curtailment of mortgage finance. California will be the poster child for this unfolding dynamic, although it will play out throughout the country. I'll reiterate my expectation that upper-end real estate — too frequently Bubbles financed by ARM, Alt-A, teaser rate, reset and interest-only mortgages — will prove greatly more problematic than subprime. Commercial real estate will be anything but immune. We have only begun to experience upheaval from the mortgage bust, dynamics that will follow a similar path to the burst technology Bubble — except the wreckage will be significantly more widespread and economic impact broad-based.

Unprecedented central bank interventions and, here at home, six-week Bank Credit growth to the tune of $220bn have sustained financial system liquidity. I question the sustainability of both. Especially with this week's apparent loosening of Credit conditions, there are great expectations for an impending revival in the securitization marketplace. The banks and Wall Street are praying. With an eye on California, I fear another ("jumbo") leg down in the ongoing mortgage crisis and an increasingly vulnerable economy. Another eye is planted on the hedge fund community, where I suspect we are only another market dislocation away from serious withdrawals and reinforcing liquidations.

One, if not the greatest, errors in central banking was committed back in 2002 — with Messrs. Greenspan and Bernanke at their respective strict and intellectual helms. They mistakenly reckoned THE bubble had popped. Together they set in motion an aggressive post-Bubble "mopping up" reflation, failing to appreciate that while the tech Bubble had burst THE Credit Bubble was poised for "blow-off" excess.

We are left today with an unbalanced Bubble Economy sustained only by ongoing and enormous Credit creation. Importantly, the Wall Street Risk Intermediation Machine is today gravely impaired, forcing the banking system to Balloon Bank Credit. This works effectively on a short-term basis, yet is an unfolding predicament. Credits to sustain a Bubble Economy are inherently highly risky (think CA mortgages or junk bonds) and it requires huge quantities of them. Bubble economies are replete with negative cash flow entities and others that become increasingly so as finance is curtailed and redirected. Today, the banking system is ill-prepared to play the role of lender of last resort for long. Moreover, the scope of required ongoing Credit inflation ensures dollar vulnerability.

An important aspect of my negative current view is the disconnect between unwavering marketplace confidence in the Fed's capacity to "reliquefy" and "reflate" and the reality of a limited arsenal and atypical lack of Federal Reserve control over unfolding developments. Importantly, Greenspan and Bernanke expended tremendous ammo in a historic reflation fight that, in the end, was a totally wasted cause. They misjudged and enfranchised the most profligate and wasteful Credit expansion in our history, while inciting a potent strain of inflation that now propagates largely outside of our control. They burned a major currency devaluation. A weaker dollar could have been a tool available to help soften today's much needed financial and economic rebalancing. Unfortunately, they used that policy card for a reflation that greatly exacerbated excesses and imbalances at home, while initiating global inflation dynamics much to the detriment of our citizens, economy and currency. We have today much greater financial fragilities, disastrous economic imbalances, and a feeble currency — whether the stock market chooses to discount it now or not.