Robert Kuttner's Parallels to 1920s, and some differences

Below find some of Robert Kuttner's very good, very harsh Oct 2 testimony to the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. In addition to rehashing historical parallels between the era and the 20s euphoria and bubble bust, he talks to more-recent-era deregulation and letting the "free market" good times roll, and, of course, the bubbles that came as a byproduct. Here's a news story from Quote.com covering the hearing. And here are the other testimonies and a webcast of the hearing.

Kuttner's four parallels between this era and the one that led to the 1929 crash are:

• Creation of asset bubbles
• Securitization of credit
• Excessive use of leverage
• Failure of regulation to keep up with financial innovation
• The nearly universal conviction, 80 years ago and today, that markets are so perfectly self-regulating that government's main job is to protect property rights, and otherwise just get out of the way

Kuttner's arguments are not unlike those made by some others over the last few years, that we've tried to chronicle here. It is nice to know, or to at least believe, that more people are listening now. To Kuttner:

The Alarming Parallels Between 1929 and 2007, Robert Kuttner, The American Prospect, Oct 2:

Testimony of Robert Kuttner
Before the Committee on Financial Services
Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
October 2, 2007

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

Thank you for this opportunity. My name is Robert Kuttner. I am an economics and financial journalist, author of several books about the economy, co-editor of The American Prospect, and former investigator for the Senate Banking Committee. I have a book appearing in a few weeks that addresses the systemic risks of financial innovation coupled with deregulation and the moral hazard of periodic bailouts.

In researching the book, I devoted a lot of effort to reviewing the abuses of the 1920s, the effort in the 1930s to create a financial system that would prevent repetition of those abuses, and the steady dismantling of the safeguards over the last three decades in the name of free markets and financial innovation.

The Senate Banking Committee, in the celebrated Pecora Hearings of 1933 and 1934, laid the groundwork for the modern edifice of financial regulation. I suspect that they would be appalled at the parallels between the systemic risks of the 1920s and many of the modern practices that have been permitted to seep back in to our financial markets.

Although the particulars are different, my reading of financial history suggests that the abuses and risks are all too similar and enduring. When you strip them down to their essence, they are variations on a few hardy perennials – excessive leveraging, misrepresentation, insider conflicts of interest, non-transparency, and the triumph of engineered euphoria over evidence.

The most basic and alarming parallel is the creation of asset bubbles, in which the purveyors of securities use very high leverage; the securities are sold to the public or to specialized funds with underlying collateral of uncertain value; and financial middlemen extract exorbitant returns at the expense of the real economy. This was the essence of the abuse of public utilities stock pyramids in the 1920s, where multi-layered holding companies allowed securities to be watered down, to the point where the real collateral was worth just a few cents on the dollar, and returns were diverted from operating companies and ratepayers. This only became exposed when the bubble burst. As Warren Buffett famously put it, you never know who is swimming naked until the tide goes out.

There is good evidence — and I will add to the record a paper on this subject by the Federal Reserve staff economists Dean Maki and Michael Palumbo — that even much of the boom of the late 1990s was built substantially on asset bubbles. ["Disentangling the Wealth Effect: a Cohort Analysis of Household Savings in the 1990s" [PDF]]

A second parallel is what today we would call securitization of credit. Some people think this is a recent innovation, but in fact it was the core technique that made possible the dangerous practices of the 1920. Banks would originate and repackage highly speculative loans, market them as securities through their retail networks, using the prestigious brand name of the bank — e.g. Morgan or Chase — as a proxy for the soundness of the security. It was this practice, and the ensuing collapse when so much of the paper went bad, that led Congress to enact the Glass-Steagall Act, requiring bankers to decide either to be commercial banks—part of the monetary system, closely supervised and subject to reserve requirements, given deposit insurance, and access to the Fed's discount window; or investment banks that were not government guaranteed, but that were soon subjected to an extensive disclosure regime under the SEC.

Since repeal of Glass Steagall in 1999, after more than a decade of de facto inroads, super-banks have been able to re-enact the same kinds of structural conflicts of interest that were endemic in the 1920s – lending to speculators, packaging and securitizing credits and then selling them off, wholesale or retail, and extracting fees at every step along the way. And, much of this paper is even more opaque to bank examiners than its counterparts were in the 1920s. Much of it isn’t paper at all, and the whole process is supercharged by computers and automated formulas. An independent source of instability is that while these credit derivatives are said to increase liquidity and serve as shock absorbers, in fact their bets are often in the same direction — assuming perpetually rising asset prices — so in a credit crisis they can act as net de-stabilizers.

A third parallel is the excessive use of leverage. In the 1920s, not only were there pervasive stock-watering schemes, but there was no limit on margin. If you thought the market was just going up forever, you could borrow most of the cost of your investment, via loans conveniently provided by your stockbroker. It worked well on the upside. When it didn’t work so well on the downside, Congress subsequently imposed margin limits. But anybody who knows anything about derivatives or hedge funds knows that margin limits are for little people. High rollers, with credit derivatives, can use leverage at ratios of ten to one, or a hundred to one, limited only by their self confidence and taste for risk. Private equity, which might be better named private debt, gets its astronomically high rate of return on equity capital, through the use of borrowed money. The equity is fairly small. As in the 1920s, the game continues only as long as asset prices continue to inflate; and all the leverage contributes to the asset inflation, conveniently creating higher priced collateral against which to borrow even more money.

The fourth parallel is the corruption of the gatekeepers. In the 1920s, the corrupted insiders were brokers running stock pools and bankers as purveyors of watered stock. 1990s, it was accountants, auditors and stock analysts, who were supposedly agents of investors, but who turned out to be confederates of corporate executives. You can give this an antiseptic academic term and call it a failure of agency, but a better phrase is conflicts of interest. In this decade, it remains to be seen whether the bond rating agencies were corrupted by conflicts of interest, or merely incompetent. The core structural conflict is that the rating agencies are paid by the firms that issue the bonds. Who gets the business – the rating agencies with tough standards or generous ones? Are ratings for sale? And what, really, is the technical basis for their ratings? All of this is opaque, and unregulated, and only now being investigated by Congress and the SEC.

Yet another parallel is the failure of regulation to keep up with financial innovation that is either far too risky to justify the benefit to the real economy, or just plain corrupt, or both. In the 1920s, many of these securities were utterly opaque. Ferdinand Pecora, in his 1939 memoirs describing the pyramid schemes of public utility holding companies, the most notorious of which was controlled by the Insull family, opined that the pyramid structure was not even fully understood by Mr. Insull. The same could be said of many of today's derivatives on which technical traders make their fortunes.

By contrast, in the traditional banking system a bank examiner could look at a bank's loan portfolio, see that loans were backed by collateral and verify that they were performing. If they were not, the bank was made to increase its reserves. Today's examiner is not able to value a lot of the paper held by banks, and must rely on the banks' own models, which clearly failed to predict what happened in the case of sub-prime. The largest banking conglomerates are subjected to consolidated regulation, but the jurisdiction is fragmented, and at best the regulatory agencies can only make educated guesses about whether balance sheets are strong enough to withstand pressures when novel and exotic instruments create market conditions that cannot be anticipated by models.

A last parallel is ideological — the nearly universal conviction, 80 years ago and today, that markets are so perfectly self-regulating that government's main job is to protect property rights, and otherwise just get out of the way.

We all know the history. The regulatory reforms of the New Deal saved capitalism from its own self-cannibalizing instincts, and a reliable, transparent and regulated financial economy went on to anchor an unprecedented boom in the real economy. Financial markets were restored to their appropriate role as servants of the real economy, rather than masters. Financial regulation was pro-efficiency. I want to repeat that, because it is so utterly unfashionable, but it is well documented by economic history. Financial regulation was pro-efficiency. America's squeaky clean, transparent, reliable financial markets were the envy of the world. They undergirded the entrepreneurship and dynamism in the rest of the economy.

Beginning in the late 1970s, the beneficial effect of financial regulations has either been deliberately weakened by public policy, or has been overwhelmed by innovations not anticipated by the New Deal regulatory schema. New-Deal-era has become a term of abuse. Who needs New Deal protections in an Internet age?

Of course, there are some important differences between the economy of the 1920s, and the one that began in the deregulatory era that dates to the late 1970s. The economy did not crash in 1987 with the stock market, or in 2000-01. Among the reasons are the existence of federal breakwaters such as deposit insurance, and the stabilizing influence of public spending, now nearly one dollar in three counting federal, state, and local public outlay, which limits collapses of private demand.

But I will focus on just one difference — the most important one. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the Federal Reserve had neither the tools, nor the experience, nor the self-confidence to act decisively in a credit crisis. But today, whenever the speculative excesses lead to a crash, the Fed races to the rescue. No, it doesn't bail our every single speculator (though it did a pretty good job in the two Mexican rescues) but it bails out the speculative system, so that the next round of excess can proceed. And somehow, this is scored as trusting free markets, overlooking the plain fact that the Fed is part of the U.S. government.

When big banks lost many tens of billions on third world loans in the 1980s, the Fed and the Treasury collaborated on workouts, and desisted from requiring that the loans be marked to market, lest several money center banks be declared insolvent. When Citibank was under water in 1990, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York personally undertook a secret mission to Riyadh to persuade a Saudi prince to pump in billions in capital and to agree to be a passive investor.

In 1998, the Fed convened a meeting of the big banks and all but ordered a bailout of Long Term Capital Management, an uninsured and unregulated hedge fund whose collapse was nonetheless putting the broad capital markets at risk. And even though Chairman Greenspan had expressed worry two years (and several thousand points) earlier that "irrational exuberance" was creating a stock market bubble, big losses in currency speculation in East Asia and Russia led Greenspan to keep cutting rates, despite his foreboding that cheaper money would just pump up markets and invite still more speculation.

And finally in the dot-com crash of 2000-01, the speculative abuses and insider conflicts of interest that fueled the stock bubble were very reminiscent of 1929. But a general depression was not triggered by the market collapse, because the Fed again came to the rescue with very cheap money.

So when things are booming, the financial engineers can advise government not to spoil the party. But when things go bust, they can count on the Fed to rescue them with emergency infusions of cash and cheaper interest rates. …

In the 1994 legislation, Congress not only gave the Fed the authority, but directed the Fed to clamp down on dangerous and predatory lending practices, including on otherwise unregulated entities such as sub-prime mortgage originators. However, for 13 years the Fed stonewalled and declined to use the authority that Congress gave it to police sub-prime lending. Even as recently as last spring, when you could not pick up a newspaper's financial pages without reading about the worsening sub-prime disaster, the Fed did not act — until this Committee made an issue of it.

Financial markets have responded to the 50 basis-point rate-cut, by bidding up stock prices, as if this crisis were over. Indeed, the financial pages have reported that as the softness in housing markets is expected to worsen, traders on Wall Street have inferred that the Fed will need to cut rates again, which has to be good for stock prices.

Mr. Chairman, we are living on borrowed time. And the vulnerability goes far beyond the spillover effects of the sub-prime debacle. …

One last parallel: I am chilled, as I’m sure you are, every time I hear a high public official or a Wall Street eminence utter the reassuring words, "The economic fundamentals are sound." Those same words were used by President Hoover and the captains of finance, in the deepening chill of the winter of 1929-1930. They didn’t restore confidence, or revive the asset bubbles. …

More articles from Kuttner.

Comments

[me]

If you want more scary, I just finished "The Panic of 1907" by Brunner and Carr. As I was reading about the lines of depositors outside Knickerbocker Trust and Lincoln Trust, I saw pictures of the same scene 100 years later in the Financial Times and the lines outside Northern Rock.

[bailey]

IMO both Kuttner & Reich (his ECI COHORT) do a whole lot better talking politics from the outside looking in than they do Economics. I hadn't read Kuttner's testimony (I was so disappointed by my last reading of him I skipped this. (I just don't have a lot of patience lately for those who've fallen behind on the overt economic threats to our kids & grand-kids well-being.) Since you posted it, I read it and yes, I agree. But, so what if it's far from creating an impact?

What were the responses of the Democrats on the Senate Financial Services Committee. To me, Washingtonian Democrats & Democratic Presidential wannabees sound deplorably short-sighted & closer to the special-interest groups & Repubs across the aisle than voters who could get them elected. When will someone state the obvious to them? They may not have the votes to affect substantive change, BUT they do have the bloody pulpit, why aren't they using it?

No one Democrat on that Finance Committee created a headline by screaming about the real causes of the housing bubble - revising the cpi down by 1/4 & decentralizing our financial sector w/o updating regulatory oversight. But, they're not alone. Not one Democratic candidate for the Presidency has made an issue of how the American Economy has been turned inside out over the last ten years - against the long term best interests of the clear majority of Americans. If they are truly without a clue about what needs to be done IMMEDIATELY to give us a chance to secure a future for our kids & grandkids, they need to be educated. If they're well aware but are afraid to bring the issue up because the bills were "signed" into law by a Democratic President, then it's up to "Progressives" & Prodressive Economists to show them a path and an argument that will ensure they accomplish their one professional goal - to get elected/re-elected.

Does Kuttner's monolog help elevate or focus the overarching argument most of us voters could readily grasp? Let someone else be the judge.

IMO Dean Baker has set a high standard over the last ten years for independent Economists who wish to argue their discipline with conscience for the benefit of our kids & grandkids. But, who's listening? Certainly not the Democrats.

Baker wasn't even invited to the year's yearly Kos convention which is assumed to corral the best & brightest of "liberal" blogging activists to compare notes, plan, plot & dream. This year bloggers' fundraising/politician promoting proved strong enough to attract all the Democratic Presidential hopefuls who came with their economic advisors. My guess is, they all would have been unbearably uncomfortable with a Progressive in the room.

[Dave Iverson]

I hear you loud and clear, Bailey.

Our politicans are pretty much sound asleep as per economics and finance. My guess it that it's going to take a bit of a shock to wake them. I haven't quite figured out whether I'm more afraid of a "hard landing" or more afraid that we won't get one, and will wander further into "screw the middle class" land. Sad state of affairs.

PS.. I'm been in Yellowstone the last few days. Drop dead beautiful fall colors and Nature's wonders to boot. Lots of Elk and Bison, some Coyotes (nine in one pack) and even a few Wolves and Bears (although I missed the bears-sightings by a couple of hours(a sow and a cub Grizzley at a kill site according to those who were there earlier; all I saw there was a couple of coyotes and a few Magpies).It was a welcome reprive from my bureaucratic life and my blogs. Now to catch up on 4 days of blog posts.

[bailey]

Down here in Coastal SoCal I see growing anecdotal evidence that your second fear is warranted & may prove extremely perceptive. (Inventories are high & sales are very slow, but prices are still holding solidly.) Recent chatter suggests lenders are finetuning NEW programs to be wheeled out with further rate cuts. The intent is to open the credit taps wider than ever to those who've not abused the meager limits they were accorded in the past.
Your occasional jaunts back to the real world sound spectacular. Bureaucratic responsibilities aside, you seem to have done well carving out a piece of heaven on earth to make it all work for you. Have a great week.

[bailey]

Hey Dave, I was just out looking at a house to buy & recalled you saying something about a r.e. problem you were spending time resolving. Resolve it satisfactorily, I hope?

[Dave Iverson]

Bailey,

Problems come and go. My problems are minor, relative to most, so if I carp and complain at times, then I "should be scolded", as my grandmother used to say.

Right now I'm working on problems related to retirement and "what next", problems related to people wanting to develop around my for-25-years-rural homestead, and problems related to the mess of the US government, culture, and institutions generally.

In a way its THE BEST OF TIMES, relative to many other times in history, and my circumstances are not much less than "much better" than I would have expected even 20 years ago.. So no more complaining from me. At least not for a day or two.