Can Structured Finance Survive?

That is this week's question from Prudent Bear's Doug Noland. As for me I have decided to take a "wait and see" attitude—since I don't have faith in anyone's ability to know the future— and since my long-term approach of living frugally, saving some small sums (in part by investing a bit in things I hope offer a bit of an "asset inflation" hedge), and staying debt free for the last 20 years will MAY allow us to weather whatever storms may be on the horizon. Too many others, however, ought to be rightfully much more worried than I am by Doug Noland and others' gloom and doom forecasts. Here is a shortened form of Noland's latest:

Structured Finance Under Duress, Doug Noland, Credit Bubble Bulletin, Oct 26: The market may be been perfectly content to brush it aside. It was … a brutal week for "contemporary finance." Merrill Lynch, a kingpin of structured Credit products, shocked the marketplace with a $7.9bn asset write-down — up significantly from the $4.5bn amount discussed just two weeks ago.… Street analysts have already warned of the possibility for an additional $4bn hit. Merrill is not alone.

Also hit by sinking CDO fundamentals, Credit insurer Ambac Financial reported a third-quarter loss of $361 million — it's first-ever quarter of negative earnings. The company posted a $743 million markdown on its derivative exposures, "primarily the result of unfavorable market pricing of collateralized debt obligations." Credit insurance compatriot MBIA also reported its first loss ($36.6 million), on the back of a $352 million "mark-to-market" write-down of its "structured Credit derivatives portfolio." …

MBIA and Ambac combine for about $1.9 Trillion of "net debt service outstanding" — the amount of debt securities and Credit instruments they have guaranteed, at least in part, to make scheduled payments in the event of default. Throw in the Trillions of Credit insurance written by the mortgage guarantors and you’re talking real "money." Importantly, the marketplace is beginning to question the long-term viability of the Credit insurance industry, placing many Trillions of dollars of debt securities in potential market limbo.

With recent developments — including the monstrous write-down from Merrill Lynch, the implosion in the mortgage insurers, and the losses reported by the "financial guarantors" — in mind, I'll revisit an excerpt from a January article by the Financial Times' Gillian Tett: "…Total issuance of CDOs…reached $503bn worldwide last year, 64% up from the year before. Impressive stuff for an asset class that barely existed a decade ago. But that understates the growth. For JPMorgan's figures do not include all the private CDO deals that bankers are apparently engaged in too. Meanwhile, if you chuck index derivative portfolio numbers into the mix, the zeros get bigger: extrapolating from trends in the first nine months of last year, total CDO issuance was probably around $2,800bn last year, a threefold increase over 2005. These startling numbers will certainly not shake the world outside investment banking. For, as I noted in last week's column, the CDO explosion is occurring in a relatively opaque part of the financial system, beyond the sight — let alone control — of ordinary household investors, or politicians."

Subprime and the SIVs are peanuts these days in comparison to the gigantic global CDO and Credit derivatives markets. CDOs may lack transparency, trade infrequently, and operate outside of market pricing ("mark-to-model"). Nonetheless, CDO exposure now permeates the entire global financial system — exposure that regrettably mushroomed in the midst of the most reckless end-of-cycle mortgage excesses imaginable. Rumors this week had major insurance companies suffering huge CDO losses. To what extent the big insurance "conglomerates" have exposure to CDOs and other Credit derivatives is unclear today, but there is no doubt that the global leveraged speculating community is knee deep in the stuff. Importantly, as goes the U.S. mortgage market, so goes the CDOs. I'm not optimistic.

I don't want to place undue weight on one month's data, but the California statewide median home price sank $58,140 over the month of September (down 4.7% y-o-y to $530,830). This was by far the largest monthly decline on record and the first year-over-year fall "in more than 10 years." September California sales were down 39% from a year earlier. Weakness was statewide ….;

We've definitely reached a critical point worthy of the question: Can "structured finance," as we know it, survive the California and U.S. mortgage/housing busts? I don’t believe so. For one, the historic nature of the Credit Bubble virtually ensures the collapse of the Credit insurance "industry" (companies, markets, and derivative counter-parties). The mortgage insurers are now in the fight for their lives, while the "financial guarantors" today face an implosion of their "structured Credit" insurance business. Worse yet, major problems in municipal finance (certainly including California state and municipalities) are festering and will emerge when the economy sinks into recession. It is worth noting that California revenues were $777 million short of expectations during the first fiscal quarter ….

Returning to the vulnerable CDO market, some key dynamics are in play. With California now at the brink, uncertain but huge losses are in the pipeline for jumbo, "alt-A," and "option-ARM" mortgages — loans that were for the most part thought sound only weeks ago. The market began to revalue the top-rated CDO tranches this week, a process that should only accelerate. "AAA" is not going to mean much. If things unfold as I expect, a full-fledged run from California mortgage exposure could be in the offing. And as the dimensions of this debacle come into clearer market view, the viability of the Credit insurers will be cast further in doubt … with ramifications for Trillions of securities and derivatives. General Credit Availability would suffer mightily.

With global equities markets in melt-up mode, it might seem absurd to warn that a troubling global financial crisis is poised to worsen. But Structured Finance is Under Duress. The entire daisy-chain of liquidity agreements, securitization structures, Credit insurance and guarantees, derivatives counterparty exposures and, even, the GSEs is increasingly suspect. Trust has been broken and market confidence is not far behind.

The big global equities and commodities surge over the past few months certainly has been instrumental in counteracting what would have surely been a problematic "run" from the leveraged speculating community. How long this spectacle can divert attention from the unfolding mortgage/CDO/"structured finance" debacle is an open question. I can't think of a period when it has been more critical for stocks to rise — and rise they have. Yet I suspect recent developments will now encourage the more sophisticated players to begin reining in exposure.

The nightmare scenario - where the market abruptly comes to recognize that the leveraged speculating is hopelessly stuck in illiquid CDO, ABS, MBS, derivative and equities positions - doesn’t seem all that outrageous or distant this week. [emphasis added]

Comments

[Pat]

With losses like these there is no reason that corporations are not required to have reserve ratios sufficient to meet substantial losses as does the Federal Reserve to prevent wholesale meltdown effects of large, and heavily capitalized firms doing business multinationally.

The slim margins upon which they operate that reward bankruptcy, throw off employees, and leave in their wake, enormous financing disasters might be viewed within the same levels of security as the Fed is measured. Having occurred many times now, there is little cure except to address failure by extraordinary measures that will reduce the incentive for predatory financing that ignores the common good. Leaving losses to employees and to the public might be considered a tolerance of privateering with no end in sight.

The function of reserves, retained earnings, and capital credit radios is to prevent corporate meltdowns. To operate without these protections defies the principle of the corporation as a secure entity upon which the American people can have faith, and into which they can safely invest. Investment with immunity is inconsistent with the American way of capitalism, and should be corrected for the safety of all.

Come on people, it's just numbers!

[bailey]

This reminds me of the mess Michael Milken created when he correctly recognized, built and exploited the junk bond market. He was so greedy he left nothing on the table to encourage others to create middle markets. It took a while to work through the pain, but the benefit junk bonds offered to borrowers & issuers was so strong it survived and flourished.