Economic Dreams - Economic Nightmares

Soros: Financial Crisis Stems from Super Bubble

Like me, George Soros is no believer in "equilibrium economics". Rather he believes that sometimes we will see an equilibrium, but that it will be short-lived. Like Hyman Minsky, Soros argues that stability will itself sow the seeds of the next instability. Soros says we are in a unique place with our current crisis, experiencing both inflation and a recession at the same time. Hear/read more from Soros on today's NPR Morning Edition, Financial Crisis Stems from Super Bubble:

… Soros blames what he calls a "super-bubble" that started about 25 years ago. That's when a less-is-more philosophy became popular with economic regulators. That allowed Wall Street to invest increasing amounts of money in credit.

"The idea was that regulators always make mistakes, state interference in the markets just messes things up," Soros says. "And that was a false idea .... Regulators are human and bound to make mistakes, but markets are also human and they are also bound to make mistakes. Instead of markets always being right, they're actually always groping at trying to find out what the facts are. But they never get it right." …

Soros says there's a "super-bubble" in the economy that's bigger than just the recent housing crises, and he blames exotic financial instruments for helping cause it.

"The markets have introduced financial instruments with fancy names — CDOs and CLOs and all these strange instruments that are traded in very large volumes. And they were all constructed on the belief deviations are random.

Soros also has a new book out. Here is a snip from the introducion:

A New Paradigm for Financial Markets, Introduction, George Soros: We are in the midst of the worst financial crisis since the 1930s. In some ways it resembles other crises that have occurred in the last twenty-five years, but there is a profound difference: the current crisis marks the end of an era of credit expansion based on the dollar as the international reserve currency. The periodic crises were part of a larger boom-bust process; the current crisis is the culmination of a super-boom that has lasted for more than twenty-five years.

To understand what is going on we need a new paradigm. The currently prevailing paradigm, namely that financial markets tend towards equilibrium, is both false and misleading; our current troubles can be largely attributed to the fact that the international financial system has been developed on the basis of that paradigm.

The new paradigm I am proposing is not confined to the financial markets. It deals with the relationship between thinking and reality, and it claims that misconceptions and misinterpretations play a major role in shaping the course of history. …

Let me explain briefly how the theory of reflexivity applies to the [current] crisis. Contrary to classical economic theory, which assumes perfect knowledge, neither market participants nor the monetary and fiscal authorities can base their decisions purely on knowledge. Their misjudgments and misconceptions affect market prices, and, more importantly, market prices affect the so-called fundamentals that they are supposed to reflect. Market prices do not deviate from a theoretical equilibrium in a random manner, as the current paradigm holds. Participants' and regulators' views never correspond to the actual state of affairs; that is to say, markets never reach the equilibrium postulated by economic theory. There is a two-way reflexive connection between perception and reality which can give rise to initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating boom-bust processes, or bubbles. Every bubble consists of a trend and a misconception that interact in a reflexive manner. There has been a bubble in the U.S. housing market, but the current crisis is not merely the bursting of the housing bubble. It is bigger than the periodic financial crises we have experienced in our lifetime. All those crises are part of what I call a super-bubble—a long-term reflexive process which has evolved over the last twenty-five years or so. It consists of a prevailing trend, credit expansion, and a prevailing misconception, market fundamentalism (aka laissez-faire in the nineteenth century), which holds that markets should be given free rein. The previous crises served as successful tests which reinforced the prevailing trend and the prevailing misconception. The current crisis constitutes the turning point when both the trend and the misconception have become unsustainable. …

NPR Does Subprime

If you want a very good lay person's edition of the Credit Bubble mess, listen to NPR's Global Pool of Money Got Too Hungry (audio, 13 min., All Things Considered, May 9): "Adam Davidson and This American Life's Alex Blumberg jointly report on how rising defaults on subprime mortgages in the U.S. have became a global financial crisis. This American Life host Ira Glass talks with Michele Noris".

NPR demystifies SEVs, CDOs, MBSs, "Liar Loans," and more. The narrative concludes: "… Nobody really questioned things. And why should they? Everybody was making money — right up to the day the bottom fell out."

An hour-long version — The Giant Pool of Money — airs this weekend on This American Life.

One Approach to Financial Re-Regulation

At Vox, Avinash Persaud serves up a regulatory finance model I think might work:

The inappropriateness of financial regulation, Avinash Persaud, May 1, 2008: … [The] model we have today, I venture [to say] is a highly dangerous model. It is expropriation of gains by bankers and socialization of costs by taxpayers. Paying for a decade of bank bonuses can be very expensive for the taxpayer and the opportunities for moral hazard are enormous. …

The alternative model rests on three pillars. The first recognises that the biggest source of market and systemic failure is the economic cycle and so regulation cannot be blind and deaf to the cycle — it must put it close to the centre. Charles Goodhart and I have proposed contra-cyclical charges — capital charges that rise as the market price of risk falls as measured by financial market prices — and a good starting point for implementation of such charges is the Spanish system of dynamic provisioning (Goodhart and Persaud 2008).

The second pillar focuses regulation on systemically important distinctions, such as maturity mismatches and leverage, and not on out-dated distinctions between banks and non-banks. Institutions without leverage or mismatch should be lightly regulated — if at all — and in particular would not be required to adhere to short term rules such as mark-to-market accounting or market-price risk sensitivity that contribute to market dislocation. Bankers will argue against this, saying that it creates an unlevel playing field, but financial markets are based on diversity, not homogeneity. Incentivising long-term investors to behave long-term will mean that there will be more buyers when banks are forced to sell.

The third pillar is requiring banks to pay an insurance premium to tax payers against the risk that the tax payer will be required to bail them out. If such a market could be created, it would not only incentivise good banking and push the focus of regulation away from process to outcomes, but it would provide an incentive for banks to be less systemic. Today, banks have an incentive to be more systemic as a bail out is then guaranteed. The right response to Citibank's routine failure to anticipate its credit risks is not for it to keep on getting bigger so that it can remain too big to fail, but for it to whither away under rising insurance premiums paid to tax payers. …

James Galbraith on the 'Collapse of Monetarism'

Hyman Minsky, John Kenneth Galbraith and John Maynard Keynes take center stage as James Galbraith throws down the gauntlet to contemporary mainstream economists. Speaking at the 25th Annual Milton Friedman Distinguished Lecture at Marietta College, Marietta, Ohio, Jamie Galbraith asks Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and a host of others to embrace the " intellectual victory of John Maynard Keynes, of John Kenneth Galbraith, of Hyman Minsky." — else to explain "why not". We will search and update on any "why nots" if and when they surface. To Galbraith:

The Collapse of Monetarism and the Irrelevance of the New Monetary Consensus [PDF], by James K. Galbraith, March 31, 2008 : … I come to bury Milton [Friedman], not to praise him. But I would like to do so on the terrain that he favored, where he was strong, and over which he ruled for many decades. This is monetary policy, monetarism, the natural rate of unemployment and the priority of fighting inflation over fighting unemployment. It is here that Friedman had his largest practical impact and also his greatest intellectual success. It was on this battleground that he beat out the entire Keynesian establishment of the 1960s, stuck as they were on a stable Phillips Curve. It was here that he set the stage for the counter-revolution that has dominated academic macroeconomics for a generation, and that – far more important — also dominated and continues to influence the way in which most people think about monetary policy and the fight against inflation.

What was monetarism? Friedman famously defined it as the proposition that "inflation is everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon." This meant that money and prices were tied together. But more than that, Friedman believed that money was a policy variable — a quantity that the Central Bank could create or destroy at will. Create too much, there would be inflation. Create too little, and the economy might collapse. There followed from this that the right amount would generate the right result: stable prices at what Friedman came to call the natural rate of unemployment.

The intent and effect of this line of reasoning was to defend a core proposition about capitalism: that free and unfettered markets are intrinsically stable. In Friedman's gospels government is the lone serpent in Eden, while the task of policy is to stay out of the way. Just as this was the vulgar lesson of "Free to Choose" so it turns out it was also the deep lesson of the larger structure of Friedman's thought. Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History for all its facts and statistics carried a simple message: the market did not fail; the government did.

Friedman succeeded because his work was complex enough to lend an aspect of scientific achievement to his ideas, and because the ideas played to the preconceptions of a particular circle. As Keynes wrote of Ricardo:"The completeness of [his] victory is something of a curiosity and a mystery. It must have been due to a complex of suitabilities in the doctrine to the environment into which it was projected. That it reached conclusions quite different from what the ordinary uninstructed person would expect, added, I suppose, to its intellectual prestige. That its teaching, translated into practice, was austere and often unpalatable, lent it virtue. That it was adapted to carry a vast and consistent logical superstructure, gave it beauty. That it could explain much social injustice and apparent cruelty as an inevitable incident in the scheme of progress, and the attempt to change such things as likely…to do more harm than good, commended it to authority. That it afforded a measure of justification to the free activities of the individual capitalist, attracted to it the support of the dominant social force behind authority."

Friedman's success was similar to Ricardo's but not in all respects. Yes he also explained away injustice and supported authority. But the logical superstructure was not vast and consistent. Rather Friedman's argument was maddeningly simple, yet slippery. He would appeal to short run for some effects and to the long run for others, shifting between them as it suited him. … His money growth rules promised stable employment without inflation. Their promise was not austere, but happy. Ricardo was Scrooge. Friedman was more like the Pied Piper.

Cassandras Tire of Repetitive Stories of Gloom and Doom

For the few who tune into my musings, you may have noticed that I'm not posting much lately. This will likely continue for some time. The Epicurean Dealmaker summed up a shared blogging problem nicely yesterday. It was fun to be a Cassandra when no one would do so. But now we Cassandras grow weary of all the fuss and bother when it appears so late in the game — perhaps too late to avoid severe recession and pain. Preventive medicine would have been best, but would-be regulators were not be be seen for all the same reasons they were absent in the 1920s run-up to disaster.

So now we wait to see what will be done (amid all the talk) in the wake of the credit-crunch disaster that began last August. Later we may have more to talk about, but for now this blog will likely just track potential, much-need regulatory changes and the many stumbling blocks in the path to decent regulations (or institutional change for self-policing) as per: leverage, margin and reserve requirements, executive compensations, firewalls between managers and accountants, auditors, and insurance brokers, etc. Here is the ever-eloquent Epicurean Dealmaker:

Admit it, now, how many of you are enthralled to pick up your morning newspaper to read the 337th story this month on the subprime/mortgage/CDO/CDS/auction rate security crisis du jour and whether it is a) over, b) just getting started, or c) all Ben Bernanke's fault? Even the perma-bearish Bloggers of the Apocalypse, like Nouriel Roubini and pals, have become tired and tiresome to read; now, in what should be their hour of glory. They were a lot more fun to listen to when the party was in full swing, and their jeremiads carried the desperate tang of Cassandras who know they are right but can get no-one to listen.

Meanwhile, the rest of us soldier on, heads down, with appropriately downcast and guilty expressions painted on our faces to show that we, too, realize we were at fault in this and therefore should not be sacrificed on the General Altar of Economic Contrition. Even the profiles of potential villains of the month we read nowadays, like those of mortgage meltdown lottery winner John Paulson and evil-genius-turned-bumbling-oaf Stephen Feinberg, carry all the gustatory excitement of cold mashed potatoes on a dirty plate. Who cares?

It is against this cheerless background that your Dedicated Correspondent finds it difficult to lift the proverbial pen and dash off yet another scintillating missive from the frontiers of Vanity, Hubris, and Financial Shenanigans. …

But I have high hopes that this condition is merely temporary. Neither economic recession—whether in progress, merely looming, or just a figment of anti-capitalist scaremongers—nor a newly discovered probity and sobriety among the Captains of Finance and Industry can persuade me that Human Folly has been repealed in perpetuum. I am unshakeable in my belief that there are individuals out there, right now, who are planning their own apotheosis and subsequent self-immolation on the field of Mammon with such a grandeur and flair that my very fingertips tingle with excitement. I promise you, Faithful Readers, that as soon as they lumber out I will set forth, quill and keyboard in hand, to puncture their pomposity and skewer their self-regard as of old.

In the meantime, I can do little more than paraphrase the Immortal Bard:

"An ass, an ass! My kingdom for an ass!"

Speaking of John Paulson and Stephen Feinberg, here they are again, compliments of Andrew Samwick: Top ten hedge fund managers with the highest personal earnings in 2007

Short take on MuCulley at the Hyman Minsky Conference

I've been meaning to post up a cut-down version Paul McCulley's recent assessment of our current plight: "Reverse Minsky Moment" interview with Kathryn M. Welling, but haven't yet. So yesterday I was glad to see Floyd Norris do a spot on McCulley's talk at the Hyman Minsky Conference for the NY times, titled Ponzi Squared:

… Minsky argued there were three levels of investment as the cycle progresses. First comes hedging, in which investments are made to reduce risk. Then comes the speculative phase, and finally the Ponzi phase, in which the investment can be justified only by the assumption that prices will keep rising, not by the expected income.

Paul McCulley of Pimco, the big bond manager, gave an interesting speech in which he said the recent subprime mortgage fiasco proceeded to a fourth level — one that he called "Ponzi-squared" — before it collapsed.

At the end, he said, the marginal subprime loan was:

No money down
No documentation of income
Initial below-market teaser interest rate
Negative amortization

That is not a loan, he said. Instead, it amounted to giving the home buyer a call option to buy the house at the current market price, coupled with a put option to sell the house back at that price.

If house prices kept rising, the "buyer" could make the small interest payments to keep the option open, and eventually sell the house. That happened for a time, and led to the conclusion by rating agencies that such borrowers were good risks.

But when prices went down, the "buyer" would suffer no loss if he exercised the put and gave the house to the lender. That is just what happened.

As Paul Simon wrote in 1975, said Mr. McCulley, the strategy became:

Drop off the key, Lee,
And set yourself free.

Here is the written version of McCulley's April 17 talk at the Minsky Conference. Oddly, the "Drop off the Key" remarks are not included, although they are in the longer, Welling-McCulley rendition above. Some tidbits:

… [I]n what I call a "Reverse Minsky Journey" … Ponzi Units evaporate. Then many Speculative Units morph into Ponzi Units and are shot. Surviving Speculative Units are only those with explicit liquidity support from banks, who have explicit liquidity support from the Federal Reserve. Hedge Units, of course, remain standing tall, fundamentally sound, though cheaper in price, providing an excellent long-term buying opportunity.

This has been precisely the process in place since almost a year ago, and particularly since last August, when the shadow banking system — defined as any levered lender who does not have access to (1) deposit insurance and/or (2) the Fed’s discount window — experienced a modern-day run, with asset-backed commercial paper holders refusing to roll over their paper. It has not been fun. It has not been pretty. And it is not over.

Along the way, policy makers have slowly recognized the Minsky Moment followed by the unfolding Reverse Minsky Journey. But I want to emphasize "slowly," as policy makers, collectively, still suffer from more than a thermos full of denial. Part of the reason is human nature: to acknowledge a Reverse Minsky Journey, it is first necessary to acknowledge a preceding Forward Minsky Journey — a bubble in asset and debt prices — as the marginal unit of debt creation morphed from Hedge to Speculative to Ponzi.

That is difficult for policy makers to do, especially ones who claim an inability to recognize bubbles while they are forming and, therefore, don’t believe that prophylactic action against them is appropriate. Nobody likes to admit they were blind, dumb, or asleep at the switch. Or all three. …

That's not to say that Minsky had confidence that regulators could stay out in front of short-term profit-driven innovation in financial arrangements. Indeed, he believed precisely the opposite:

"In a world of businessmen and financial intermediaries who aggressively seek profit, innovators will always outpace regulators; the authorities cannot prevent changes in the structure of portfolios from occurring. What they can do is keep the asset-equity ratio of banks within bounds by setting equity-absorption ratios for various types of assets. If the authorities constrain banks and are aware of the activities of fringe banks and other financial institutions, they are in a better position to attenuate the disruptive expansionary tendencies of our economy."

Minsky wrote those words in 1986! Twenty-two years later, we can only bemoan that his sensible counsel was ignored. …

Minsky's insight that financial capitalism is inherently and endogenously given to bubbles and busts is not just right, but spectacularly right. And when the financial regulators are not only asleep but actively cheerleading financial innovation outside their direct purview, a disaster is in the making, as the last year has taught us. We have much to learn and relearn from the great man as we collectively restore prudential common sense to bank regulation — both for conventional banks and shadow banks.

Cecchetti on Recent Fed Policy Changes

(Via David Beckworth at Macro and Other Market Musings, April 11:

Previously I discussed how much of what you learned in your money and banking class is now outdated given the many policy innovations by the Federal Reserve since last summer. Stephen Cecchetti now has a nice summary of these innovations that can be found here (shorter version) or here (longer version). Read these updates and you will be current on the workings of the Federal Reserve.

I too find Cecchetti to be a good go-to source on where things stand and where we may be heading—barring bad politics, too-intense lobby pressures, and host of other interferences that seem to get in the way of "Economics Dreams".

Speaking of Money and Banking "learning" being outdated, consider this from Kevin Quinn at Econospeak, April 9

It is scandalous that nowhere in what passes for mainstream macroeconomics will you find anything that helps you understand what Hyman Minsky called "financial fragility" - the inherent instability of the credit system - and the implications for the real economy. No models - nothing!! - Nothing in a macroeconomics textbook that would aid in understanding the current crisis, and countless previous cises in the history of capitalism….

Deregulation Gone Wild - from Mark Wenzel's New Blog

Mark Wenzel caught my attention with his recent reflections on the intertwined legacies of Ronald Reagan and Alan Greenspan, including the unleashing of "free market fundamentalism", the repeal of Glass-Steagall, and the emergence of the latest loopholes for the rich and powerful to exploit at the yet-to-be-tallied expense of the so-called middle- and lower classes. It is well worth a look, and Wenzel's blog Capital Market Musings worth a bookmark. A snip from Wenzel:

The Credit Bubble, Deregulation Gone Wild and Saving the Financial Industry from Itself, Mark Wenzel, April 4:

West Berlin, Germany. June 12, 1987;
"...if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr.
Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" …

For the role that America and Ronald Reagan played in that, it represented to many a moment that came to symbolize the best of what America had to offer. There's another side though, the economic one and specifically deregulation of the financial industry, where the aftermath of the transformational presidency that was Ronald Reagan hasn't exactly gone as planned. In regards to the current financial crisis described by many as the worst in multiple generations, billionaire investor George Soros stated here;

"The cause of the current troubles dates back to 1980, when U.S. President Ronald Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to power, Soros said. It was during this time that borrowing ballooned and regulation of banks and financial markets became less stringent. These leaders, Soros said, believed that markets are self-correcting, meaning that if prices get out of whack, they will eventually revert to historical norms. Instead, this laissez-faire attitude created the current housing bubble, which in turn led to the seizing up of credit markets..."

Soros further opines elsewhere;

"...regulations have been progressively relaxed until they have practically disappeared". …

One of the first targets of financial system deregulation in the Reagan administration was savings banks and commercial banks. …

In less then 7 years after the initiation of this major banking deregulation, in February of 1989, President Bush (the first of course) unveiled the S&L bailout plan. …

In 1998, the stakes are raised, as the financial industry goes for the juggular. Again from Frontline; …

"After 12 attempts in 25 years, Congress finally repeals Glass-Steagall, rewarding financial companies for more than 20 years and $300 million worth of lobbying efforts. Supporters hail the change as the long-overdue demise of a Depression-era relic."

Fresh off of this "victory", incredulously, the man who was charged with being the banking systems chief regulator, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan continued to lead the charge towards a completely unregulated financial system as he turned his sites towards championing the growth of unregulated derivatives. …

The ensuing years saw the accelerating phenomenon where, with the last major regulatory impediment removed, and more importantly perhaps, not replaced with any form of updated regulation, the credit bubble accelerated, fueled heavily by the explosive growth in unregulated derivatives. #8230;

The result of this is that today we have what is called the $516 trillion shadow banking system, the "secret banking system built on derivatives and untouched by regulation" according to the worlds largest bond fund manager, Bill Gross.

Further, in getting back to the current credit crisis, here we are today, in somewhat of a repeat of the S&L deregulation followed by bailout scenario, in that we have the Glass-Steagall deregulation followed in a similar amount of time by the bailout brigade. This time though, the stakes are much higher. …

Is this what we have reduced our financial system to? Where it is so weak and fragile that the failure of a single investment bank threatens a widespread financial calamity. If so, how did we let it reach this point? In my mind, extremist laissez-faire deregulation surely played a heavy part.

So where do we go from here? By no means am I advocating that we turn back time and reinstall the regulations that previously existed "as is". Further, of course regulation can just as easily go too far (see India here). Free markets are constantly evolving and innovating. Rather then always turning to deregulate though, perhaps its time to work more towards liberalization & modernization but not to the point of removing the systems of checks and balances that helped to make America the great economic power that it is. …

Go read the rest!

HT: Seeking Alpha

Butier Responds to Greenspan's Latest Attempt to Rewrite History

{Updated, April 9}
At maverecon Willem Butier counters Alan Greenspan's latest claim the he and the US Fed not be held responsible, in large part, for our current mess. Butier's eight policy "tragedies":

1. The Greenspan Fed (August 1987 - January 2006) did indeed contribute, through excessively lax monetary policy, to the US housing boom that has now turned to bust.
2. The Greenspan-Bernanke put is real. It is an example of an inappropriate monetary policy response to a stock market decline.
3. The Greenspan Fed focused erroneously on core inflation, rather than using all available brain cells to predict underlying headline inflation in the medium term.
4. The Greenspan Fed failed to appreciate the downside of the rapid securitisation during the first half of this decade and acted exclusively as a cheerleader for its undoubted virtues.
5. The Greenspan Fed displayed a naive faith in the self-regulating and self-policing properties of financial markets and private financial institutions.
6. The Greenspan Fed, by enabling the rescue of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, acted as a moral hazard incubator.
7. The failure of the Greenspan Fed to press, before or after LTCM, for a special insolvency resolution regime with prompt corrective action features for all highly leveraged private financial institutions that were likely to be deemed too big and too systemically important to fail, demonstrates either bad judgement or regulatory capture.
8. During his years as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Mr. Greenspan's statements reflected a partial (in every sense of the world) understanding of how free competitive markets based on private ownership work. This partial understanding guided his actions as monetary policy maker and financial regulator. Mr Greenspan's theories have been comprehensively refuted by the financial crises of 1997/98 and 2007/08.

Butier elaborates on each. We will bring forward only one, dealing with possibilities for moral hazard. But before we do, I just found Martin Wolf's counter-balancing position, Ft.com, April 8, still praising Greenspan, while fearing that over-zealous regulatory reform spaned by a Greenspan "blame game" will kill the "good" that free-er (my word, Wolf uses "free) market mechanisms bring. Whereas Butier lists eight "tragedies" of Fed policy/practice, Wolf highlights two: (1) regulators should have been "tougher", in subprime and elsewhere, and (2) monetary policy should have been tigher, not looser — to lean against prevailing winds of excess instead of leaning with them.

David Beckworth, via Macro and Other Musings, adds insight into why Butier's critique is on target:

… [T]he Federal Reserve is a monetary hegemon. It holds the world's main reserve currency and many emerging markets are pegged to dollar. Thus, it's monetary policy is exported across the globe. This means that the ECB, even though the Euro officially floats, has to be mindful of U.S. monetary policy lest its currency becomes too expensive relative to the dollar and all the other currencies pegged to the dollar. The Fed's loosening, therefore, of monetary policy in the early-to-mid 2000s triggered a global liquidity glut that set the stage the subsequent housing boom-bust cycle. This is not to say the 'saving glut' and financial innovation had no role, but rather that loose monetary policy was a key factor behind the boom. …

Back To Butier:

The Greenspan Fed: a tragedy of errors, Willem Butier, maverecon:Financial Times, April 8: Mr Greenspan's apologia pro vita sua in the Financial Times of Monday, April 7 2008 fails to convince. …

Grizzly Times, Yet Some Hope on Horizon

Grizzly Bears roam the financial landscape: Doug Noland and Michael Shedlock here (or here) are ever-bearish, but so is Barry Ritholtz (Forbes video link). The "D" word is uttered ever-more-frequently. Yet I find myself thinking that just beyond this likely deep recession we are at the leading edge of a reformation: re-forming financial institutions—private and government—and bringing US and other banking "kicking and screaming" into the 21st Century.

In this I share hopes with Brad DeLong, Paul McCulley, Robert Shiller, and George Soros (or better still watch Soros: via the Financial Times in extended post). No one who is awake believes we will escape our current moment without at minimum a deep, prolonged recession. But some observers, like those just mentioned are less cynical than are they who believe that we are predestined to once-again repeat the tragedies of the recent past and earlier times—in particular to continue to reward speculative excess.

As per reform, Thursday's Senate Oversight hearings on the Bear Stearns mess (C-Span video link)) is almost 5 hrs. long, but worth watching to better understand where Ben Bernanke (Fed), Timothy Geithner ( NY Fed), Christopher Cox (SEC), and Robert Steel (Treasury) stand regarding hoped-for reregulation. (I recommend first panel: 3 hr. 40 min.)

It is by no means certain that we will indeed reregulate our system to once-again disallow the worst excesses of extended bouts of irrational exuberance and the irrational pessimism that must follow. But wu might. We must! I've hoped for reforms too often in the past and been disappointed, but signs of hope are on the horizon at a time when moderates are beginning to take the reins of power in the US Congress away from borrow-and-spend neoCons on the far right and traditional tax-and-spend Democrats on the far left.

Let's not be eager to blame the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the SEC for this mess. NeoCons and "free market fundamentalism" are better targets for blame. And let's not forget that there was good reason for bringing the Federal Reserve system into being long ago—to curb the excesses of "boom and bust" cycles. The system worked reasonably well after the late 20s, early 30s debacle to disallow Hyman Minsky’s PONZI FINANCE moments. That is, it worked well until the so-called "Republican Revolution" dismantled regulatory functions of government here in the US.

I’m not naïve enough to believe that we could have weathered the storms brought about by recent financial and technological innovations without some pain, but the real tragedy I see is that "we the people" of the USA haven't yet figured out that we need good government to accompany good markets—and that neither can work effectively in isolation or without continued vigilance and oversight from citizens and the press (now fortified with internet commentary).

Government agencies and institutions must begin to wake up to realities that W. Edwards Deming, Peter Drucker, and many newer management writers have helped the best of our private-sector entities understand—that innovation and quality reform must be institutionalized into the fabric of agencies and institutions, to be ongoing and ever-vigilant of changes in external environment that must be incorporated into internal corporate and government cultures. Let's hope wider government reform begins with the Fed, the SEC, and the Treasury.