Forest Policy - Forest Practice

Mark Rey Dodges Contempt of Court Charges Dave Iverson

Missuola, MT — For several months Federal Judge Donald Molloy has threatened to throw the Forest Service's USDA boss Mark Rey in jail for foot-dragging relative to Molloy's specific judicial mandate to comply with NEPA relative to fire retardant drops on national forests. Molloy believed that an incarceration threat for "contempt of court" might spur the Forest Service into action to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act relative to fire-related government actions—specifically, in this case, fire retardant drops. Yesterday, Judge Molloy let Rey off the hook — for now — but took the opportunity to scold the Forest Service and Rey for what Molloy called "systematic disregard of the rule of law." Here's more from The Missoulian, Feb 28:

… U.S. District Judge Donald Molloy cleared Rey, the Bush administration's top forest official, and the Forest Service of contempt and withdrew his threat to jail Rey or ground all fire retardant air tankers until the agency evaluated the environmental impact of the chemical slurry.

Molloy did not rule on the merits of the Forest Service's environmental analysis, and the watchdog group whose lawsuit prompted the showdown said it planned to take new legal action to challenge the agency's finding that aerial retardant causes little harm to fish and other aquatic creatures.

"We accomplished what we wanted to do, which was to make the Forest Service follow the law," said Andy Stahl, director of the Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics, based in Eugene, Ore.

In his testimony, Rey apologized for the Forest Service's tardiness in following the judge's order to complete an environmental analysis of the potential harm from ammonium phosphate, the primary ingredient in retardant dropped on wildfires.

But Molloy was not mollified and forced Forest Service employees in their testimony to acknowledge their "systematic disregard of the rule of law."

Before announcing his ruling, Molloy delivered a blistering criticism of the Forest Service, saying only a threat of contempt prompted the agency to comply with the nation's top environmental laws - the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act.

The judge also questioned the federal government's battery of lawyers who handled the case, dismissing their "attempts" at explaining the delays and their "parsing of words to create unjustifiable arguments."

Rey and other Forest Service officials maintained they had acted in good faith, but Molloy said it was "shameful" that it took a threat of contempt to make the agency comply with the law.

"Something's remiss," Molloy said. 'I don't know if it's the lawyering or an institutional matter." …

I'm inclined to think it an institutional matter — the Forest Service believes it is on a divine mission to do good work — to do "good projects on the ground" — instead of rightfully seeing itself as an agency of government that must justify its work both to three branches of government as well as to the American people in complying with various environmental statutes. More details here, related to NEPA compliance responsibilites.

NEPA Outsourcing Dead, for Now Dave Iverson

On February 20, Forest Service Chief Gail Kimbell officially killed 'NEPA outsourcing' — that is, "put on hold" both NEPA related OMB-led "competitive sourcing" as well as Forest Service-led "NEPA Business Process Reengineering". In a letter to Forest Service top brass, Kimbell laid out these reasons:

… the recently-enacted Omnibus Appropriations Act directed that we not use any funds for further competitive sourcing activities. At a time when we are in the midst of ongoing Transformation efforts and the continuing transition to the Albuquerque Service Center, we want to avoid additional disruption and confusion that could come with overhauling our critical NEPA processes.

But Chief Kimbell left the door ajar for future tinkering, and suggested that result from the NEPA Feasibility Study [PDF] provide guidance for NEPA Streamlining, do be done "locally" for now, but perchance more broadly in the future:

Recognizing that NEPA processes are at the heart of our decision-making, it is important that we retain a strong linkage between Forest Service employees and those analytical procedures. It remains important, however, for us to seek long-term strategies to improve NEPA efficiency. I appreciate the comprehensive analysis and informative data in the Feasibility Study. It serves as a foundation for future work. Results from the Study—coupled with open communication—will help us identify and analyze best strategies for streamlining NEPA processes in the future.

Two quick points: First, NEPA is not an analytical procedure, and mistaking it for such perpetuates a Forest Service culture that continues to lose in court and frustrate both the courts and the public. Second, just what might one find in the NEPA Feasibility Study to provide useful guidance toward "best strategies" for streamlining NEPA compliance? Once again we ask, " What will it take to get the agency to think about the distinctions between procedures required by NEPA and the process of making decisions regarding management of the National Forests?" And we reiterate our earlier plea for reframing.

George Wuerthner Gets it Right on Fire, Ecosystems, Management Dave Iverson

A friend took a moment to read through and summarize George Wuerthner's critique of Forest Service (and others) mis-aligined assumptions re: fire, ecosystems, and management 'fixes'. Time for the Forest Service to wake up! Time to abandon ideas of 'quick fixes' to complex ecological problems! Some of us think it is at least time. Here is my friend's summary:

1. For most forest types, and perhaps even all forest types, it is simply not known if there is an unnatural accumulation of fuels that is outside the historic range of variability. It seems most large wildfires are more closely correlated with weather and climate patterns rather than fuel conditions.



2. Accordingly, for most forest types, and perhaps even all forest types, it is not known if there is an effective way to treat any unnatural fuel accumulations that may exist in a way that:



• actually reduces fire hazard or risk
• reduces fire hazard or risk for any more than a short window of time
• does not do more environmental harm than good by:
• causing soil compaction and erosion
• creating roading and increased access and human use
• altering insect, disease, and decay biota
• altering wildlife habitat


3. Humans cannot treat forests at a scale that would make any significant difference in the occurrence of large wildland fires, even if there are fuel buildups which are creating an unnatural hazard or risk and were effective treatments which are known to reduce them.



4. Humans are not capable of implementing silvicultural treatments with a sufficient degree of precision at a large enough scale to accomplish objectives for hazard or risk reduction, even if there are fuel buildups which are creating an unnatural hazard and risk and were effective treatments which are known to reduce them.



5. Corollary: Some silvicultural treatments can be accomplished at a very localized level and small scale with sufficient precision to protect human development from catastrophic wildfire. Silvicultural treatments can effectively reduce fuel buildups at a small scale where the expense can be justified, and treatments can be repeated periodically to maintain hazard and risk protection. However, these treatments can only be effective if done in conjunction with architectural treatments and land use zoning and restrictions to protect buildings. It must be recognized though that there are significant costs attributable to:
   • capital and labor for repeated, intensive, and precisely implemented silvicultural treatments;
   • loss of attributes of the natural forest ecosystem and other environmental degradation where these forest fuels treatments are implemented;
   • and limitations imposed on type and location of development.

If Wuerthner gets it wrong, we'd like to know where and to what extent. Comments are open…

'Confirming Evidence' Trap: Ecological Restoration Edition Dave Iverson

It is well known among decision science practitioners that we are prone to seek evidence to confirm preconceived biases. Government agencies are no less prone. Neither the US Congress. Enter George Wuerthner (Ecological Projects Director, Foundation for Deep Ecology) in a Jan. 18 letter to Senator Ron Wyden, arguing that thinning forests to help "restore" human-distrubed forests to functioning ecosystems may be based on flawed assumptions. Wuerthner's letter stems from Wyden's recent suggestion that he will likely introduce legislation to thin forests to "Increase Forest Health, Reduce Fires, Increase Jobs".

It will prove interesting to see whether or not Wuerthner's arguments hold sway in the Congress. And it will prove interesting to see what impact they may have on the Forest Service and/or the courts. Here, in part, is Wuerthner's argument:

Dear Senator Wyden;
18 January 2008

In light of the legislation you are considering, I wanted to make you all aware of a potentially flawed assumption about fire regimes, particularly as it applies to lower elevation ponderosa pine and also secondarily to Douglas fir and western larch. …

Most ecologists agree that stand replacement fires are the norm for mid-high elevation forests. That is, fire suppression which is thought to have influenced low elevation forest types, has not significantly altered moister forest types. That would include west side Doug fir forests, as well as higher elevation fir, spruce, and other conifer forests that dominate the Cascades, Blue Mountains and so forth. Thinning to reduce fire hazard or risk in these forests is a waste of time since when forests are ready to burn, they burn with vigor that thinning does not influence. More on that later.

However, there is a growing controversy about interpretation of fire history and the influence of fire suppression surrounding even the lower elevation drier forests. Most of the research on ponderosa pine fire dynamics has been influenced by the so-called "southwest US" model. This model has held that fires in ponderosa pine, in particular, burned very frequently and seldom experienced stand replacement or high intensity blazes. As such, many believe that fire suppression has caused these forest types, and subsequent fires in them, to be outside of the historic range of variability.

I wanted to make you aware that new research that is increasingly questioning this assumption.

For one, large blazes we are experiencing today are likely more the consequence of climatic conditions than fuels—in all forest types. And changes in fire behavior and intensity that deviate from past fire regimes such as they are understood, may be more a consequence of climatic change than anything to do with fire suppression or forestry practices—not that these are inconsequential, but that climate and fire weather (wind, drought and low humidity) may be the big driver in all large blazes.

This has big implications for what is the appropriate management response.

Secondarily recent research … has begun to question whether even the model of high frequently/low intensity blazes as typically ascribed to ponderosa pine forests is accurate.( See http://jfsp.nifc.gov/conferenceproc/Ma-01Kaufmannetal.pdf) Many of the assumptions about fire behavior and fire regimes are based on older research that is now being challenged. …

There are other recent studies confirming the same basic conclusion—the historic range of variability in ponderosa pine forests may not be as simple as often implied. Thus management prescriptions based upon this model MAY BE FLAWED.

Bear in mind that many fire history reconstructions are full of errors. …

There are other problems with past fire studies enumerated as well, not the least of which is the expectation that ponderosa pine always experienced frequent fires, thus researchers tended to find confirmation of that assumption and did not seriously critique the study methods used to reach such conclusions.

That does not mean that generalization about ponderosa pine fire regimes in the region are scientifically suspect, but at the least, one needs to review all past studies with caution and see if current characterizations of fire regimes in the area are accurate or suffer from many of the flaws outlined in the Baker paper [William L. Baker, Thomas T. Veblen, Rosemary L. Sherriff (2007) February 2007, Fire, fuels and restoration of ponderosa pine-Douglas fir forests in the Rocky Mountains, USA Journal of Biogeography 34 (2), 251–269].

I suspect that PNW and Rocky Mountains forests, particularly mixed ponderosa pine and Douglas fir/western larch forests are not as out of whack as assumed. And at the very least, what was the past condition may not be relevant to the present situation of global warming which is changing climatic conditions.

In addition there is increasing evidence that climatic conditions are the drivers of most large fires in the West. …

There are two major consequences of climatic controls on fires. The first is that the vast majority of all fires go out without burning a substantial amount of acres. That's because under most conditions, forests just don't burn all that well. These small fires seldom burn more than a hundred acres.

However, when the weather/climatic conditions are severe, almost everything will burn. The vast majority of all acreage burned in any season occurs in a few very large blazes, typically burning 50,000 acres or more, with a few reaching into the hundreds of thousands of acres. This is an important point. Our management policies, including thinning projects, are directed towards stopping or reducing the few very large fires, not the normal run of the mill fires.

However, these blazes are driven by low humidity, high temperatures, extended drought and most importantly wind. Humans can't control these factors. Notice that I did not mention fuels. It appears that under these circumstances, fires will roar through all fuels types, and even very lightly stocked stands will burn. Note that in the Biscuit Fire of 2002 very lightly stocked Jeffrey pine stands burned. These stands are naturally thinner than what you could find even in a very aggressive thinning program. Thinning might work to slow or half fires under less than severe conditions. However, under less than severe conditions, aggressive fire fighting can usually stop a blaze anyway. It is under severe conditions when fire fighting is ineffective that thinning is also ineffective.

Keep in mind that opening up a forest by thinning can actually have the opposite effect than intended. Removal of trees can increase the likelihood of a large blaze, and result in higher mortality of trees, especially during severe fire weather conditions by increasing solar insulation that dries fine fuels, and increasing wind penetration. See Hanson and Odion 2006. Fire severity in mechanically thinned forests versus unthinned forests of the Sierra Nevada, CA.

A further problem with thinning is that thinning, even where proponents suggest it is effective, will readily admit that effectiveness declines rapidly over time. Once you open the canopy up and remove competing vegetation, you encourage rapid new growth of shrubs and small trees, which are the fuels that carry a blaze. So thinning is not a one time cost, but rather an on-going long term cost that will require frequent follow up treatments. If you are not willing to continuously rethin the forest (and/or allow natural fires to burn), you have to ask how likely is it for any particular patch of timber to burn, in any particular year. Probability is actually quite low.

However, it is my view that thinning is not an effective means of reducing fire hazard under extreme fire conditions. Note that I qualify by saying extreme. Most of the evidence suggesting thinning is effective is from fires that were burning under less than extreme conditions at the time when the fire front reached the thinned sites. And for every study/observation suggesting that thinning halted or slowed fires, there are other anecdotal observations and/or studies finding that thinning were not effective in halting big fires. Typically what I find is that wind is the big factor. If wind is roaring along at 50 mph or more, no thinning is effective. If there is little or light wind than thinning may work. But again it is exactly under the conditions when there are high winds that big blazes are created and driven—so these are the fires we are concerned about. …

[D]ue to global climate change, we are seeing a shift back to a drier, warmer climate which is responsible for the larger blazes we are seeing. In a way, the occurrence of large blazes like the Biscuit Fire is perfectly normal—not an aberration. It is Nature's way of adjusting to the new climatic realities. Given these realities we can not hope to fire proof our forests. Rather the only reasonable response is for home owners and communities to take greater responsibility for reducing fire risk. Many studies have shown that fire proofing a home with metal roofs, removal of brush around a home's perimeter, etc. is far more effective for fire proofing a community than trying to thin the forest. Additionally land use zoning that keeps people from constructing homes in harm’s way is also important.

A further problem with trying to fire proof the forest by thinning is the creation of disturbance from logging operations can have many negative ecological effects including the spread of weeds to sedimentation from logging roads to the removal of large woody debris from the site. Logging is not a benign activity. Active restoration fueled by logging dollars and logging practices may in the end be worse than just allowing passive restoration to occur. (See my book on Wildfires for a good overview and refresher on the ecological differences between logging and fire). Any presumed benefit from restoration must be weighed against the impacts associated with logging—and all impacts must be accounted—and they frequently are ignored.

George Wuerthner
Ecological Projects Director
Foundation for Deep Ecology

NEPA Outsourcing Games Continue Dave Iverson

If you care about Public Lands and their use and abuse by the agencies that manage them, you should keep close tabs on what the US Forest Service is doing as per compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). And you should closely watch what it is doing with TO its NEPA practitioners — people charged with keeping the agency honest in compliance.

Late last year the US Congress disallowed the Administration from considering outsourcing the people who manage what the Forest Service calls the "NEPA Process" via OMB "Competitive Sourcing" mandates (you have to dig deep into the Omnibus Appropriations Act for details). So now the game shifts to what the agency calls "Business Process Reengineering". Preliminary indicators are not promising.

In a study undertaken by the US Forest Service and shared internally last August, [PDF], there are strong hints that the course forward will involve clustering agency NEPA practitioners into regional service centers. It seems that the agency believes that NEPA compliance is about analytics, not public engagement in deciding proper direction and action for policy, programs, and projects. I disagree, as I noted in SOURCED! — NEPA Next in Line.

NEPA is not the problem with what the Forest Service labels "process gridlock", as I outlined earlier. Rather, appropriate NEPA compliance is a way forward for the agency and the Congress to begin a much-needed rethinking of the Forest Service's vision, mission, policies, and programs. And to begin for the first time to serioully seek means to comply with the laws that govern it.

We will be watching as the "FS Business Process Reengineering" moves along. Too bad we can't watch closely via the Forest Service's new management blog which, unfortunately, was relegated to the Intranet — a firewall away from public scrutiny. (But we would welcome any hints as to the success of the blog from agency folks).

Public Employees For Environmental Responsibility (PEER) has more today, beginning:

The U.S. Forest Service is on the verge of approving a massive restructuring that will remove land management planning from individual forests, according to agency documents released today by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER). The resulting reorganization will affect one in four agency jobs, shrink its on-the-ground firefighting militia and rigidify resource planning. …

Ninth Circuit Court Strikes Down FS Fuels Treatment CE Dave Iverson

In Oct. 2005 I suggested — tongue in cheek — that the Federal Government just write a blanket provision saying, "Henceforth all federal 'good projects on the ground' will be exempt from NEPA, NFMA, ESA, the National Historic Preservation Act, …". Acting out their rightful role as guardians of balanced power in government, the courts have steadfastly maintained that such would not be allowed—that in fact such administrative arrogance would ultimately prove to be a coffin of their own design.

Yesterday, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals put a few more nails in this particular Administrative coffin, ruling in part: "We conclude that the Forest Service failed to assess properly the significance of the hazardous fuels reduction categorical exclusion and thus it failed to demonstrate that it made a 'reasoned decision' to promulgate the Fuels CE based on relevant factors and information. Accordingly, its promulgation of the Fuels CE was arbitrary and capricious." The rest is here: SIERRA CLUB v. BOSWORTH, 12/05/07 [PDF: 32pp] I found this "Discussion" particularly illuminating:

Continue reading "Ninth Circuit Court Strikes Down FS Fuels Treatment CE"

The Forest Service and the Carbon Offsets Game Dave Iverson

Writing in High Country News, Rick Craig suggests that the US Forest Service's entry into the carbon offsets game is ill-advised. Here's a snip:

Salvaging the Atmosphere: The Forest Service Joins the Carbon Offsets Game, Rick Craig, High Country News, Oct 15: … On July 25, Forest Service Chief Gail Kimbell announced the launch of the Carbon Capital Fund, which will sell carbon offsets to fund tree planting on national forests. … The idea sounds logical enough. In fact, the theory that forests can suck up excess carbon and cool the planet helps drive a market that doubled its revenues last year to $110 million. But the Forest Service's entry into the carbon offsets game comes as doubts about tree planting mount. Scientists are skeptical about its benefits, and the honesty of the unregulated market has been questioned in congressional hearings. Worst of all, critics feel, is the tacit permission offsets give buyers to continue their carbon-emitting lifestyles.

Visit the Web site of the National Forest Foundation, the Forest Service's nonprofit arm, and its Carbon Footprint Calculator can tell you how many metric tons of CO2 emissions you are responsible for. If the result leaves you feeling guilty, don't worry. For just $6, the fund lets you offset 1 ton of carbon by supporting tree-planting projects on the national forests. The transaction is based on the theory that forests act as "carbon sinks," soaking up the greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.

But in temperate forests, the concept has not held up well to scientific analysis. Forests do take carbon out of the atmosphere temporarily, but they don’t remove it from the active carbon pool, because their carbon is released when they rot or burn. Cambridge botanist Oliver Rackham, author of a history of Britain's forests, has said that telling people to plant trees to stop global warming is like telling them to drink more water to keep down rising sea levels. …

For an agency with increasingly stretched budgets, however, selling that commodity makes a difference. … And with the agency's million-acre reforestation backlog, there's no shortage of places for consumers to relieve their carbon guilt. [NFF hypertlink added]

See also:

Privatization by Many Means: Carbon Offsets Edition, Forest Policy …, Aug 27
Carbon Offsets: Modern Day 'Indulgences'?, Ecological Economics, Feb 20

The Big Green Fire Machine is Hungry Dave Iverson

If you've ever wondered why the Forest Service is so interested in Carbon Trading, and "Global Climate Change Initiative" — e.g. FS Strategic Plan or Chief Kimbell's Oct. speech on "Globalization" — simply follow the money trail. Last week Dan Berman noted that the Forest Service is in line to receive up to a Billion Dollars a year from sale of carbon credits:

Senate cap-and-trade bill could mean billions for firefighting, Dan Berman, E&E Daily, Nov 2: Federal fire suppression efforts stand to benefit greatly from a cap-and-trade auction for carbon credits, thanks to a provision added to a Senate bill late last week.

The bill could mean $1.1 billion per year for Forest Service and Interior Department firefighting costs between 2012 and 2050, relieving the annual strain on agency budgets. Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) added the provision to a substitute amendment from Sens. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) and John Warner (R-Va.) before a Senate Environment and Public Works subcommittee approved the underlying legislation last week. …

Some argue that this will spell relief for budget taps the Big Green Fire Machine, or the Fire-Military-Industrial-Complex as Wildfire called it, has on agency budgets. But in another way "free money" will add more incentives for extant fire fighting procedures to become even more entrenched and resistant to change. This "dark side" suggests that we ought to be wary of this and any other pot of "free money".

NEPA is Not the Problem Dave Iverson

For years the Forest Service has complained about "process gridlock", "analysis paralysis", which it claims bog the agency down by slowing project implementation to a crawl and diverting dwindling agency funds. The finger of blame is often pointed at the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and its procedural requirements for analysis and documentation. Most recently, in the Forest Service has announced preliminary plans it claims will trim about $90 million from its annual costs for "NEPA process".

WAIT A MINUTE! Is "NEPA" really the problem causing paralysis and gridlock? Isn't there more to decision making than just the analysis of potential environmental effects of a proposed action required by NEPA? Isn't there an array of laws, regulations, directives, policies, and other factors that impose process rquirements, and costs, for decision making by a government agency? Is the issue being looked at too narrowly by focusing only on NEPA, or is NEPA mistakenly being blamed for the broad spectrum of legal and other requirements for agency decision making?

The recent A-76–related NEPA "Feasibility Study" (internal, not available for public review) (Jan 14 Update: Feasibility Study now daylighted here: [PDF]) notes:

… The term "NEPA process" is commonly used … to refer to suite of activities including project identification, information gathering, environmental analysis, compliance with substantive environmental laws, and responding to administrative and legal challenges. In many cases, [the NEPA process] is viewed as the agency decision-making process. (emphasis added)

So which is it? Are we talking about the analysis of potential environmental effects of a proposed action as required by NEPA, or are we talking about the entire administrative process the Forest Service uses to make proposals and decisions for actions, including the process requirements of other laws and regulations, and the political, social, budgetary, and other considerations that drive decisions to act?

What will it take to get the agency to think about the distinctions between procedures required by NEPA and the process of making decisions regarding management of the National Forests?

If form indeed follows function, isn't it imperative to thoroughly think through what the agency does before trying to create an organization to do it? Most certainly, the Forest Service does more than "NEPA". However, its "NEPA" Feasibility Study appears at times to encompass not just NEPA, but administrative decision making.

A similar fuzzing of lines occurs in the Forest Service’s 1900-1 course, which while being billed as "NEPA" training, seems to encompass many of the broader aspects of administrative decision making. The curriculum for this course is being revisited, and it would seem equally important to clarify whether this is a "NEPA" course or an "administrative decision making" course. If it is the former, then where do Forest Service employees receive formal instruction in decision making? If it is the latter, by focusing on NEPA does it do justice to the other aspects of administrative decision making?

Just below is a graphic representation of the many legal and other influences on administrative decision making. While there is some overlap with NEPA, there are aspects of each that fall partially, and sometimes entirely, outside of NEPA. Together, these make up the minimum components for any Forest Service decision to take action. Where are these elements of decision making addressed in any discussion of organization or training designed to alleviate process gridlock?

Where Key acronyms (With Wikipedia hyperlinks) are:

• APA: The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
• NEPA: The Environmental Policy Act of 1969
• NFMA: The National Forest Management Act of 1976
• ESA: The Endangered Species Act of 1973
• NHPA: The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966
• CAA: The Clean Air Act of 1963
• CWA: The Clean Water Act of 1972

Note: We recognize that both the chart and list above exclude some important laws that need to be fleshed out in training and education. Note further that dates associated with laws are just the beginning dates for laws that have since been amended.

Isn't it time to starting thinking more explicitly about "function" — the elements of decision making — before charging off after organizational "form" and related training needs? Training is indeed important, but if the Forest Service never questions fundamentals of process, efforts to restructure/revamp training are likely to be the stuff of "rearranging deck chairs…" rather than much-needed re-framing.

For further consideration, here is a link to a PowerPoint that fleshes out some preliminary thoughts as to how the Forest Service might better organize its thinking/training/process to help employees deal with the broad task of decision making, rather the focusing in on what is but one element of the "Decision Process".

SOURCED! - NEPA Next in Line Dave Iverson

Following recent trends in the rest of the US Government, the Forest Service continues with wave after wave of outsourcing (or in-house "clustering") accompanied by downsizing. Feeling frustrated and helpless to right what I think wrong, I refer to those affected as having been SOURCED! or CLUSTERED! Hence the title for this post.

Back in 1995 I remember Luna Leopold telling Forest Service managers that they were presiding over the destruction of America's public forests. Today it seems that Forest Service managers are presiding over the destruction of the Forest Service itself. Maybe I'm an incurable cynic — maybe? — but it seems like we are in a crises breeder-reactor. As crises deepen, increasingly no one wants to talk about it.

The Forest Service's recently accelerated downsizing began with Information Technology and Contracting, then spread to Personnel (which now carries the title "Human Capital" following a brief moment when employees were equally demeaned by the label "Human Resources"). Right now the downsizing wave is threatening a domain that the Forest Service calls NEPA: the process for compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Never mind that NEPA can't quite be envisioned to be a staff function. Never mind that the responsibilities and requirements of the NEPA Act seem to many to be nothing if not "inherently governmental" — therefore not something to be SOURCED!

It gets worse: One way the Forest Service circumvents Competitive Sourcing mandates, that stem from OMB circular A-76, is by re-labeling the "sourcing" outside A-76 as "Business Process Re-engineering". The results are too often similar, resulting in clustered service centers and fewer employees.

In the "Age of Information", with emergent mass-communication networks, no one disagrees that in there ought to be some shifting from clerical worker' help to self-help. Still, bureaucratic managers seem too focused on "clustered service centers" and not enough focused on the real needs of real people both now and in the future. No one seems willing to talk through, "what work?" and "What is work?" for the 21st century. No one seems willing to talk through "Who needs to do whatever it is that is 'work'?"

The NEPA study, formally the "Feasibility Study of Activities Related to … NEPA Compliance Final Report", August 10, 2007 seems to miss the mark on every front. It is the stuff of questionnaires anchored in the air, "data calls" that mask the emptiness of the inquiry, then volumes of data fed back to NEPA practitioners as if to mask the emptiness. Someday soon, maybe we'll be able to daylight the study. Until then, I'll leave my damning 'take' of the study as one opinion—an opinion that seems to be shared by many who are voicing similar concerns internally.

A few specific problems with the "Feasibility Study":

• Failure to recognize the relationship between NEPA compliance and administrative decision making under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) Wikipedia: APA
• Failure to demonstrate that NEPA compliance practices and responsibilities are not "inherently governmental"
• Failure to fully evaluate both sides of the "contract it out" v. "working-it-inside" puzzle, thereby biasing results in favor of "contract it out":
• Failure to fully evaluate time spent administering contracts in complex, nuanced, and ever-changing decision and analysis contexts
• Failure to fully evaluate the costs of "farming out" responsibilities and tasks that are inherently tied to "public trust" issues that requires relationships to be built and maintained.

A few references related to A-76 and/or the NEPA "Feasibility Study":

• Internal Organization and External Contracting for the NEPA Process: Lessons from the New Institutional Economics and Strategic Organizational Design [PDF], Kenneth Richards et al., September 20, 2007
• Testimony on "Defining 'Inherently governmental' work, and problems arising from agencies being forced to try to 'blend' contractor and federal workforces", [PDF], Jacqueline Simon, American Federation of Gov. Employees AFL-CIO, December 19, 2005

When, if ever, will the Forest Service begin serious inquiry into how it ought to function in the 21st Century? It certainly hasn't done so to this point, and if the recent foray into "Transformation" is any guide, the agency is not about to engage in serious organizational inquiry any time soon.

{Updated: 10/11/07}